

Lecture 16

Analytical Discourse and Non-Analytical Discourse And “Expressing Perfect Teaching”

In the last lecture we mentioned that if we wish to understand the meaning of Perfect Teaching¹ discussed by the Tiantai school [founded ca. 575 CE], we must first understand the special character of the *prajñā* sūtras [Wisdom sūtras]. This means that we must first understand the concept of analytical discourse [*fenbie shuo*, differentiating, discriminating, or discursive discourse] versus non-analytical discourse, a concept which has not been considered by the West. It is one that originated with Buddhism. Even for those converted to Buddhism in the past, this was a concept that was difficult to articulate. The terms they used to describe this concept did not quite express the meaning. These terms and the fundamental concepts they tried to express are discussed in my *Foxing yu Bore* [*Buddha-nature and Prajñā*], where the terms are scattered about in the book, occurring over and over again. For example, I summarized these concepts when I discussed the *prajñā* sūtras and *Mulamādyamaka-karika* [*Zhongguan lun, Treatise on the Contemplation of the Middle Path*], and naturally referred to them also in my critical evaluation of the Huayan school and Tiantai school. There is an appendix in *Foxing yu Bore* that can be described as an overall summary of those concepts. I had originally intended it to be the introduction to the book but decided it was better as an appendix. This appendix is entitled “Analytical Discourse and Non-Analytical Discourse [*fenbie shuo yu fei fenbie shuo* 分別說與非分別說].”¹ Although it is the appendix, we must first understand the meaning of analytical discourse and non-analytical discourse if we wish to understand what is meant by Perfect Teaching.

Fenbie shuo [differentiating, discriminating, discursive discourse] and *fei fenbie shuo* [non-differentiating, discriminating, discursive discourse] are Buddhist terms. They may be called differentiating discourse [*chabie shuo* 差別說] and non-differentiating discussion. Using modern Western terminology, they are analytical discourse [*fenjie shuo*] and non-analytical discourse. As to this question, I feel that all human thought processes may be subsumed under analytical [*fenbie*] discourse and non-analytical discourse. That is why I often feel that when present-day British and American philosophers speak of analytic [*fenxi*]

philosophy as if analytic philosophy belonged to them and that other philosophies are non-analytic they are thoroughly wrong. In a broad sense, Western philosophies from their very beginnings until now have generally taken the analytical [*fenjie*] path. For example, Plato [427-348/7 BCE], Aristotle [384?-322 BCE], Leibniz [1646-1716] and Kant [1724-1804] all walked along the analytical path. The logical analysis or language analysis that is in fashion in Britain and America now is not the only analytical philosophy; other philosophies can also make use of analysis as a method of expression. In Western philosophy Hegel [1770-1831] was the only one who did not take the analytical path. He adopted the dialectical method. In the dialectical method, the concepts established by analytical discussion are digested first and then the dialectical method is used to unify them. But in the process of unifying them, analytical discussion frequently emerges. Speaking as a whole, what one calls dialectical synthesis consists of first presupposing a number of analytical statements. That is why if a student of Western philosophy wants to study Hegel's thought, he has to study Kant's philosophy first or the philosophy prior to Kant such as Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz and so on. In other words, one has to have a solid grasp of analytical concepts before advancing to the questions dealt with by dialectical synthesis. Before Hegel discussed dialectical unification he presupposed analytical concepts. And when he entered the process of dialectical unification, he often presented his own analytical explanation; it was just that he did not isolate it as an analytical explanation. Whereas Kant and philosophers in general usually took out a concept and gave it an independent discussion, Hegel's philosophy used dialectical synthesis as an over-arching form, with analytical discussions occurring at any time or supplementing the process of dialectical synthesis.

In addition to Hegel as an example of non-analytical discourse, there is yet another form, what Western philosophy calls mysticism. Of course there is no analytical discourse in mysticism, and not only that, but the "mystical" is the unsayable. But in Western philosophy mysticism cannot constitute a formal system of philosophy. There is only such a thing as a mystical state, but philosophers have never treated mysticism as an independent system of philosophy. However, in Eastern philosophy mysticism has been squarely, positively, confronted, and has been able to assume an independent identity. What is more, most of the effort in Eastern philosophy has been concentrated in this area. This being the case, there is

then some question as to whether we can use the Western term “mysticism” to describe this kind of Eastern thought. Western mysticism exists in a moment in the Western philosophical tradition and has no independent status. We can say that mysticism is a kind of thought that is not valued by Western thinkers. It is not held in particularly high esteem. Thus the mysticism that presents itself in special guises in Western philosophy would be properly confronted in the East, and would be allowed to present itself completely. Whether we could then describe it as “mysticism” would be questionable. If you wish to describe Eastern philosophy as mystical, it can also be mystical. Mystical implications are to be found everywhere in the Buddhist scriptures. For example, such words as “Treasury of Profound Wisdom of Three Virtues” [*San De Bimi Zang* 三德秘密藏], “the inconceivable state of one thought-instant surveying three thousand worlds [一念三千不思議境]”, “The road of thought comes to an end, the path of speech is cut off [心行路絕，言語道斷],” and so on. There is a mystical flavor to these statements, but can you use the Western word mysticism to explain them?

Fung Yu-lan’s *A History of Chinese Philosophy* [*Zhongguo Zhexue Shi*, 1931-1934] uses the term mysticism to encompass the thought of Mencius,² Zhuang Zi,³ the *Doctrine of the Mean*, and the *Yijing* Commentaries, a classification which we found disconcerting. For Mencius’s thought has head and tail, beginning and end. His thought is expressed very lucidly. How can one pin him down with the label “mysticism”? Treating him this way is highly dubious. That is why I think the Western term “mysticism” is unsuitable for Chinese philosophy. Mencius, for instance, said: “All things are complete in me. There is no greater joy than when I examine myself and find sincerity [萬物皆備於我矣。反身而誠，樂莫大焉].”⁴ Superficially, this statement seems to have a mystical flavor. Then there is: “To be great and dissolving-transcending it is called sagely; to be sagely and unfathomable is called divine [大而化之之謂聖，聖而不可知之之謂神].”⁵ On the face of it these statements do have a mystical flavor. But if we understand why Mencius said these words, then we cannot take them in isolation. There are words that preceded this latter statement.⁶ Nor is the former statement spoken out of a vacuum. The statements form part of a system, and to label them or collect them under mysticism is unfair. If you call them mysticism, then we may

reply that, according to the Chinese, only thoughts like these represent real reason. Then are they to be seen as rationalism or as mysticism? This becomes quite a problem. At present what Western philosophers call reason takes logic as the standard to define reason. That is what is called logical reason. But Mr. Liang Shuming [1893-1988] very early on understood that the Chinese do not approach reason from this perspective. Reason to the Chinese is seen from the perspective of what Confucius called “*ren*” [humanity, humaneness]”. Only Confucius’s *ren* can truly represent reason, and *ren* opens up many mental states [*jingjie*]. But Fung Yu-lan simply fixed it with the label of mysticism, an attitude very different from Liang’s. From this we can see a number of problems. The reason I bring up this question is to show that Western mysticism is not something very clear. Nor has mysticism in the West been squarely, positively, faced. Nor has it been fully laid out. In China, however, this kind of thought can be looked straight in the eye and can be fully laid out. And so we cannot bracket such thought under mysticism. Mr. Liang Shuming has pointed out that this is not mysticism but is where real reason lies. By doing this, he elevated the meaning of reason, and his concept is a highly heuristic one.

From this we can see that there are many things that can be expressed by shared terms or **categories**, but there are also many that cannot be borrowed casually. That is why we should understand the boundaries between different thoughts, and should refrain from making rash comparisons. For instance, when Kant in the *Critique of Practical Reason* criticizes mysticism, he says himself: “My theory on the one hand guards against empiricism and on the other hand guards against mysticism.” But although this is one stone killing two birds, from the perspective of moral laws empiricism is most pernicious and most deplorable, while on the other hand, mysticism does not contradict the fundamental spirit of morality, and the two can even be compatible. Besides, mysticism has never become a fashionable pattern of thought nor an enduring intellectual mode. Because Kant held that we do not have intellectual intuition of the transcendent world, his criticism of the shortcomings of mysticism was that it affirmed that we possessed intellectual intuition of the transcendent world. The phenomenal world can only be considered as a sign or symbol of the transcendent world, a kind of typic, but according to mysticism we have intuition of the transcendent world, and going a step further, it turns symbol into schema. By schema he meant that mysticism pictorialized the transcendent world, so that it seemed to be vividly and

concretely before us. Kant pointed out that we should not concretize the transcendent world, which meant that we cannot have intuition of the transcendent world. This was Kant's understanding of the mysticism that appeared in the Western intellectual tradition.

If we apply Kant's understanding of mysticism to Chinese thought, we shall find that some of it affirms that we have intuition of the transcendent world. Since we can have intuition, then it is questionable whether we can explain it with schema. In criticizing mysticism, Kant uses the method of analogy, saying that it is analogous to the schema we use when we discuss categories. However, supposing that we have intuition of the transcendent, then it is questionable whether we would then still need to speak of schema. If, turning to Eastern philosophy, we compare Confucianism with Kant's thought, we find that Confucian thought is centered about morality. That is why Liang Shuming said that Confucianism is based on *ren*, and *ren* is reason. If so, then it is highly questionable whether we can use the mysticism of the West (including the mysticism criticized by Kant) to explain the mental states that are thrown open by *ren*.

Similarly, when we now talk about the question of Perfect Teaching and come to the concept of analytical discourse and non-analytical discourse, we must squarely, positively, face the question introduced above, so that it can be fully laid out. This is an aspect which Kant did not consider in detail. All of Western philosophy is analytical discourse, with the exception of Hegel's dialectical method and the method of mysticism. But according to the Buddhist mode of expression, some of the concepts of mysticism can be expressed through the analytical method as well as the non-analytical method. The mysticism understood and defined by Kant uses the analytical method of discussion and is not truly non-analytical discourse. To say that it uses the analytical method means that it tells us what mysticism is, tells us "so-and-so is such-and-such." All this is using the analytical method. This is still not the non-analytical discourse method of Perfect Teaching. As to Hegel's dialectical method, it is non-analytical discourse in relation to all the analytical discourse. But suppose we ask, What is dialectic? How is it possible? On which level is dialectic meaningful? These three questions together with our consideration of them constitute an analytical discourse of dialectic. To give an analytical explanation of dialectic is to enable us to understand the concept of "dialectic." But dialectic itself is a curvilinear presentation. When we see dialectic as a curvilinear presentation and not as an object that we can understand

through analytical thought, then all the concepts and explanations we have used to understand dialectic are dissolved. This then is the non-analytical discourse of dialectic, and resembles the method expressed by the Chan [Zen] school.

Likewise with mysticism. Mysticism is purportedly unutterable, but when we ask what mysticism is, Kant can explain analytically what mysticism is. This then is the mysticism of analytical discourse. Thus anything can be expressed through analytical discourse or non-analytical discourse.

The analytic philosophy that is fashionable at present [1978] in Britain and America is analytic philosophy in a very narrow sense. Analytic philosophers are most averse to taking a position, in other words, to establishing fixed principles, or establishing any teaching or doctrine. Thus analytic philosophers are always saying that what they are talking about is a method, not a doctrine. If pressed, they will always give this answer. Actually, they are unaware that they do have a doctrine. Analytic philosophy is not just a method. They have a noose behind them and this noose is their doctrine. Of course if you press them, they will keep retreating, insisting all the while that what they are talking about is only a method, which is the reason they call it analytic philosophy. Little do they know that what they label as analytic philosophy is in fact a doctrine.

For instance, when they give an example, they love to take a statement of Hegel's. But when they use Hegel's statements as illustrations, they are not interested in understanding them, only in making him an object of derision. If they take Hegel as an object of derision, then their analysis is not just a method but has become a noose, with doctrine behind it. If analytic philosophy is only a method, then regardless of whether we agree with it or not we should first try to understand a statement before we make it an object of derision.

Then again when we speak of reason, we can of course use analytic philosophy, such as language analysis or logical analysis to analyze it. On the other hand, "reason" is also an everyday term. It is not only a term in philosophical language but a term in ordinary language. Consequently, when confronted with "reason" we should of course be allowed to analyze it and present its meaning on every level. We should not be biased when we are analyzing reason. They reduce reason to language, reducing reason to syntax or rules of syntax. Once this happens, the mystical flavor of reason disappears. Why is that? Because

it is invisible and intangible. Just as when we speak of justice, “you can say you are just, I can say I am just, and as to who is just Heaven only knows”. Analytic philosophy maintains that since reason is a term in metaphysics, it has to be reduced to language, to syntax.

How do analytic philosophers see syntax as reason? They maintain that syntax has rules of formation as well as rules of transformation. How syntax is constructed, for example, how to construct a proposition such as “All S are P” requires “rules of formation.” Or take a syllogism such as “If M is P, and S is M, then S is P.” “Rules of transformation” are required for the relationship of the three parts of the syllogism in order that the first two propositions can result in the consequence. This syllogism is an example of logical inference, and logical inference is seen here. From the static standpoint, it is a kind of inference, while from the dynamic standpoint it is a reasoning process. No matter whether it is static or dynamic, the “reason” that we speak of traditionally starts here. If you ask whether it is clear or not, it is already very clear. If you say it is not clear, then we can switch a term and use “rules of transformation” to explain the transitional relationships of “If M is P, and S is M, then S is P.” This is reducing reason to “rules of transformation.” This uses language analysis, in other words, the formalization or regularization of language. When analytic philosophers explain in this fashion, they must have a position, and that is their doctrine. It is quite obvious that they dislike the term “reason,” and so they convert it into language and syntax. But syntax also requires reason. For example, when there is a grammatical error, not only must one correct it, but one must give one’s reason. It is through rules of grammar that this reason judges whether there is an error or not, and this is judgement and inference by means of one’s reason.

The attempt by the adherents of logical or language analysis to reduce reason to language because of their dislike of the term “reason,” and their view that it can be laid out, is the modern method of thinking. That is why I often say that present-day man is without reason [*wu li*], without force [*wu li*], and without substance (*wu ti*). According to the theory of relativity in physics and the philosophy of Hume, they don’t like the concepts of “force” and “substance”, nor do they like “reason.” That is why I say modern man is without reason, without force, and without substance [*wu li, wu li, wu ti* 無理，無力，無體]. The theory of relativity does not need the concept of “force,” while Hume’s philosophy maintains that “force” cannot be proved. Russell, who vigorously promoted this kind of thought,

subsequently got rid of “force.” Analytic philosophers claim that “force” is a metaphysical assumption. This sort of thought has had an effect on the mentality of contemporary man. The clever intellectual has become light and forceless. And because they dislike substance, contemporary man can be said to be without substance, finding it impossible to stand on solid ground. Can you then call their theory merely a method? It is a teaching or doctrine, behind which stands a prejudice. Their theory leads ultimately to there being no reason, no force, and no substance.

We cannot entirely use language analysis to eliminate reason, force, or substance. In discussing scientific knowledge or a given question, you may ignore reason, force, and so on, but you cannot on the basis of a position or a principle regard these concepts as meaningless, or as metaphysical assumptions, and then get rid of them. This kind of attitude is wrong. In some respects, concepts such as reason, force, and substance are important, and should not be eliminated wholesale. Thus we see that those of the logical analysis school have their biases. And these biases imply a teaching or doctrine. In other words, they imply a noose which is generally imperceptible. So we must understand how this sort of thinking came about. What questions were they discussing? And within what confines? I am not saying that they are necessarily wrong. Naturally they have their reasons. But what I dislike is that noose hidden behind them. In order to avoid being ensnared, we must understand the origins of certain terms, and the questions through which they developed.

In a certain sense, Buddhism is also without reason, without force, without substance. That is why the Neo-Confucianist Huang Lizhou [1610-1695] adjudged “*tian li*” [Heavenly Principle/Reason, moral law] to be the two words which distinguished Buddhism from Confucianism. Heavenly Principle(s) also means reason. Confucianism affirmed Heavenly Principle/Reason, while Buddhism did not have the concept of Heavenly Principle/Reason. They had many common features but they were completely different in this respect. That is why Buddhism maintained that all dharmas are without substance, they are illusion-like, delusion-like, what is called “The myriad dharmas are not self-arising, nor arising of others, each its own, nor without cause, which is why we know that they are non-arising.”⁷ On a certain level of meaning, it is similar to Hume’s use of analysis to criticize causality. When Buddhism speaks of “enduring the non-arising of dharmas” [*wusheng fa ren* 無生法忍], it is saying that the concept of “arising/origination [*sheng*]” is incomprehensible. Thus it said

that the myriad dharmas are not self-arising, nor arising of others, each its own, nor without cause, which is why we know they are non-arising. If we pursue this line of thought, we can also get rid of the notion of “force.” For if we treat “force” as an independent concept having self-substance, then in the process of dependent-origination [conditioned origination, conditioned arising] the concept of “force” is also incomprehensible. In a certain sense, dependent origination can have force and energy, but as soon as we say not permanent nor extinct, not arising nor ceasing, not coming nor going, then we are speaking of conditioned-arising dharmas as being without reason, without force, and without substance. For *chang* [permanence] is equivalent to what Kant describes as the “permanence” which is determined through the category of substance. Substance is permanent and immutable. But how can dependent-origination dharmas be permanent and immutable?

But Buddhism is not entirely without reason, without force, without substance. Dependent-origination dharmas can be said to be without reason, without force, without substance. But when we come to Buddha-Womb [*tathagatagarbha*] Self-Existent Pure Mind, Nirvana Dharma-Body [*dharmakāya*], and *prajñā*, you may say they are mystical, but then they are where real reason lies. According to the Western point of view, this is mystical. But according to Buddhism, only this can be called true reason. This is when our life has the greatest clarity. Is that not reason? The reason that Westerners speak of lies completely in the troubles of consciousness, whereas the pure mind that Buddhism speaks of is really the clearest and most enlightened reason. How can it be called mysticism? That kind of assessment would be unacceptable to Buddhism. And seen on this level, you can say that there is reason [*li*] in Buddhism. That is why the *Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna* said that True Suchness [*zhenru*, Skt. *bhūtatathatā*, nature/substance thus, the Buddha-nature, the Buddha-body] has the power to influence [*xunxi*, to perfume].⁸ Influence does not necessarily mean *a posteriori* influence. True Suchness itself also has a certain power. This is having reason, force, and substance. We cannot make arbitrary comparisons on these doctrines. When Mr. Tang Yongtong [20th century] studied Buddhism, he would, whenever he came upon “dependent-origination substance-empty,” maintain that Buddhism, Hume, and Spinoza were the three best philosophies, and that the three could be integrated into one. This shows that he was confused about the distinctions between the different philosophies. That is why I mentioned earlier that in a certain sense we could use Hume’s thought to

understand Buddhist dependent-origination substance-empty. But the dependent-origination substance-empty of Buddhism is quite different from Hume's use of the analytical method to demolish causality. That is why when we look at a philosophy we should understand its origin and development and not get confused.

So it is quite obvious that the analytic philosophy in vogue in Britain and America today is the narrowest kind of analytic philosophy. They claim that what they propound is merely a method and not a doctrine, but in fact it is not merely a method, it is itself a doctrine or a noose. The harm lies in their teaching, or doctrine, for if analytic philosophy is merely treated as a method, then it is colorless, and I am in favor of that. But analytic philosophers like to say that their principles entail appealing to ordinary language. I often ask, What is ordinary language? What is not ordinary language? One's language changes in accordance with one's life. That is why children in kindergarten have their own childish way of communicating, which we often do not understand. You call the language that the Chan masters speak when they are carrying water or chopping wood the Chan masters' language, but is it not ordinary language? Since it is the ordinary everyday language of the Chan masters, why shouldn't it be ordinary language?

Or you might call what we are now speaking philosophical language. But since this is also our life and we must use it, can you say that it is not ordinary language? Then what exactly is ordinary language? It is very difficult to define, and if so, why must we confine it to this? For example, you say that God is most mysterious and that this belongs to theology. But pastors and members of a church speak of God every day. Does this belong to the sphere of ordinary language? That is why we should not hold prejudices concerning certain levels of language and exclude them lightly. Only by openly analyzing them can we solidly grasp their real meaning.

There are those who say that the later Wittgenstein was already evincing this trend toward openness. He recognized that every kind of language has its meaning, a way of thinking more open and tolerant than his earlier period. When this happened, they also began to acknowledge that when the faithful prayed to God, "God" itself had its meaning and was not merely a meaningless term. However, Wittgenstein only tolerantly acknowledged this; he did not actively or directly validate religion. Kant on the other hand, on account of his servant's belief in God, retained the existence of God. For his servant, "God" belonged to

ordinary language since it was a term his servant used unfailingly every day. Kant's attitude to religion was not only to recognize religion, but to go a step further and affirm religion, setting up religion intellectually and rationally. This Wittgenstein did not do. All he did was tolerantly acknowledge religion, but what use is that?

From this we can see that what analytic philosophers speak of is actually analysis in the narrowest sense. Analysis was not treated by them merely as a method. If one treated it purely as a method, then no matter what the language, one should be able to analyze it. Even Lao Zi's statement "The Dao that can be spoken is not the eternal Dao" [also translated "The Way [track] that can be tracked is not the eternal Way"]⁹ is a kind of language. No matter whether you agree with it or not, you should at least have a clear understanding of the statement. For this is also a sentence, and you should first understand its meaning before judging it. Instead, you pass judgment on it before you have understood it; you rush into calling it meaningless or into saying that it is not clearly expressed. Actually it is not that the other side has not expressed himself clearly; it is that you yourself have not gained a clear understanding of what he is saying.

This is often the trouble with the analytic philosophers of today. They treat subjective lack of understanding as lack of clarity on the objective side, which is unfair. For example, some analytic philosophers quote Hegel without any understanding of what he meant and then accuse him of being ambiguous. Actually this sort of judgment is simply muddle-headed. Then there are others in historical research who abhor Hegel's philosophy of history. They hold that since history is so complex, how can it be encompassed in three statements? Hegel said that the culture of the Greek and Roman period was one in which "some men are free," that Chinese culture was one in which "one man is free," that man being the emperor, and that finally in the Germanic period "all men are free." But historians wonder how so complex a subject as history can be encompassed in three sentences. So to them Hegel's statements make no sense. But you should really not decide that these three statements cannot encompass history without first looking at the meaning of the statements and asking yourself whether you really understand them. If one understands these three statements, then there is no reason why they cannot encompass history. Thus we can use "beautiful freedom" or "subjective freedom" to summarize the cultural level of a given

period. That is quite permissible and not necessarily meaningless. How does it detract it from the complexity of history?

That is why if analysis is treated merely as a method it would be the liberation of analysis, liberating analysis from logical analysis and language analysis. And the analytical discourse and non-analytical discourse that I am speaking of now is analytical discourse and non-analytical discourse in the liberated sense, which means analytic philosophy in the broad sense. Analysis in the broad sense refers to a method and not any particular philosophical position, whether one is speaking of Buddha-nature, *prajñā*, or God. However, regardless of the philosophical position, one should first clarify the meaning of one's terms. This then would be an analytical method that does not imply any position. This would be a liberated analysis in the broad sense.

If we trace Western philosophy back from logical analysis in the narrowest sense, we will find that the philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz, and Kant are all analytic. For if one has something to say, then one must explain it with the analytical method. It is impossible to explain a concept without using the analytical method. One must first tell us what this concept is before one can tell us how this concept is possible. And if it is possible, on what basis is it possible? If it is not possible, then on what basis is it not possible? The answers to these questions are all analytical discourse. It can enunciate a doctrine, and can tell us a number of doctrinal principles. To put it simply, all questions involving “What...?” are analytical discourse. For example, what is *ren* [humanity, humaneness], *yi* [duty], *li* [propriety], *zhi* [wisdom], *xin* [truthfulness], etc.? Confucianism can analytically tell us about these moral principles, because Confucianism has “what” questions regarding them. On the other hand, Daoism does not have “what” questions regarding them, only “how...?” questions, in other words, only questions that ask “How is it possible?” But although Daoism only tells us about questions that ask how is it possible, it is still analytical discourse.

In Western philosophy, both Leibniz and Russell emphasize logical analysis. It was with logical analysis that Leibniz achieved the rationalism of continental Europe. The logical analysis that was Russell's focus became empirical realism in England. Both men used the method of logical analysis, but the philosophies they produced were very different, which showed that their underlying positions were different. Then there was Locke and

Hume, both of whom used empirical analysis, which formed the empiricism of Western philosophy.

Going further, let us speak about analysis broadly. In China, when the Sage enunciated his doctrine, he was engaging in analytical discourse. For it is impossible to enunciate a doctrine without using analytical discourse. For example, when the *Analects* emphasizes the three over-arching virtues of wisdom, humanity, and courage, and a number of other concepts that they contain, that is in itself analytical discourse. And it is precisely because it is analytical discourse that we are able to know the doctrine enunciated by the Sage, and able to decide a direction for ourselves and establish a number of constraints. Although the *Dao De Jing* of Daoism adopts a different style from Confucianism, it is still analytical discourse. Take the statement “The Way that can be spoken is not the eternal Way. The Name that can be named is not the eternal Name.” It explains analytically the Way that can be expressed, the Name that can be named, the Way that cannot be spoken, and the Name that cannot be named. It tells us what Nothing [Non-Being] is and what Being is. Thus it says: “Nothing is the beginning of Heaven and Earth. Being is the mother of the myriad things...These two are procreated of the same but have different names. They are both alike called the mysterious [*xuan* 玄]. The mystery of mysteries is the door to the multitudinous marvels.”¹⁰¹¹ That is why in the *Dao De Jing* Lao Zi still tells us analytically what Dao is, what virtue is, what Nothing, Being, *xuan*, are and so on. This is analytical discourse. Here we are referring to analytical discourse in a liberated sense, and not what is generally called logical analysis or language analysis.

There are people who dislike analysis, who maintain that analysis ends in tedious fragmentation, an attitude that is also wrong. One cannot oppose the analytical method, for even the Sage enunciated his doctrine through analytical discourse. Whether it ends in fragmentation is another matter. If the analysis is relevant and apposite, what does it matter if the question is dissected into rather tedious details? Analysis does not necessarily end in tedious dissection, for you can also simplify it. Thus we cannot discard the analytical method just because it sometimes involves tedious dissection.

According to what I have just said, whenever a doctrine is enunciated, analytical discourse is used. Thus pre-Qin [pre-255 BCE] Confucianism was analytical discourse. Lao Zi's *Dao De Jing* was also analytical discourse. When Śākyamuni Buddha [d. 487? BCE]

taught the Three Imprints of a Hinayana sūtra [*san fa yin* 三法印: non-permanence, non-personality, nirvana], taught the Four Holy Truths [*si sheng ti* of misery, accumulation [of misery], extinction [of misery], and path [to extinction of passions], and taught the Five Aggregates [*wu wen* , Skt. *skandhas*] and Eight Right Paths,¹² and so forth, he was also teaching through analytical discourse. And what the Confucians of the Song [960-1127] and Ming [1368-1644] dynasties enunciated were even to a greater degree analytical discourse. Granted this, was there ever in Chinese thought non-analytical discourse? If there was, who used it? Let us put aside Buddhism, an import from India. Who, strictly speaking, in the indigenous thought of China used non-analytical discourse? This requires close examination and there are rather serious limitations. In terms of certain mental states, it may be analytical discourse, whereas in terms of certain other mental states, it may be non-analytical discourse. Take Zhuang Zi 's thought, for example. On a certain level it is non-analytical discourse. Zhuang Zi [c.369-286 BCE] uses parable, quotation [*chongyan* 重言], and ambiguity [*zhiyan* 卮言], three kinds of discourse that are, strictly speaking, non-analytical discourse. Zhuang Zi's "Tianxia [All Under Heaven]" chapter says: "...Zhuang Zhou heard his style and was pleased. Although he uttered far-fetched theories, made profligate statements, and used bizarre expressions, the times gave him free rein and did not treat him as odd. Because he regarded the world as polluted and felt that one could not speak seriously with it, he used ambiguity as something that spread and extended, used quotation as if it were real, used parable as something that was broad. All by himself he communicated with the spirit of Heaven and Earth, neither haughty towards the myriad things nor censorious on right and wrong, and in this way lived with the mundane world [莊周聞其風而悅之，以謬悠之說、荒唐之言，無端崖之辭，時恣縱而不儻，不以奇見之也。以天下為沈濁，不可與莊語，以卮言為曼衍，以重言為真，以寓言為廣。獨與天地精神往來而不傲倪於萬物，不譴是非，以與世俗處]。" This is referring to non-analytical discourse. Zhuang Zi himself said that when he spoke of truths he used parable, quotation, and ambiguity. In parables, truth is hidden in the words and not directly stated. In the method of using quotation, statements of ancient sages are quoted to emphasize the truths that are put forward. It is similar to our quoting Westerners to bolster our arguments. For example, it is more convincing if someone says "According to Socrates," "According to

Russell,” or “According to Marx.” No one will believe you if you simply say “According to Confucius.” As to “ambiguity as something that spread and extended,” ambiguity is like a colander. You can raise it at any time, and you can stop it at any time too. It can adjust to the need, and this is where the truth and the mental state can appear. This kind of method is that of non-analytical discourse.

To present truths and mental states through the non-analytical method means that these truths and states cannot be explained by the analytical method. To explain by means of concept or analysis is only one clue, one guideline. To look at the truth or the mental state as such, that is a kind of presentation, of demonstration. On a certain level, some of Zhuang Zi’s thought is expressed in this way. For example, when Zhuang Zi speaks of the pipes of heaven,¹³ he was using non-analytical expressions, only giving a hint, and likewise when he spoke of roaming. That is why if we look at Zhuang Zi’s philosophy from his use of parable, quotation, and ambiguity as well as his “far-fetched theories, profligate statements, and bizarre expressions”, we see that what he presented was simply non-analytical discourse. What he did was take some of the fundamental concepts stated analytically by Lao Zi and present it through the Subject. He also used such means as parable and so on to present them and point them out. Such truths could not be explained by means of conceptual analysis, which means they had reached the highest realm. Of course in some chapters Zhuang Zi’s thought is presented analytically. It is not entirely in the non-analytical mode. The different levels and boundaries have to be clearly distinguished.

What other philosophers after Zhuang Zi used non-analytical discourse? Zhou Lianxi [1017-1073] and Chang Hengqu [1020-1077] both used the analytical method. Cheng Mingdao [1032-1085] did not take the analytical path in explaining *lixue* [Study of Principle/Reason; Rationalism]. That is why some people say that he belongs to the Chan [Zen] school. Of course he sometimes discoursed in the analytical mode. The individuals who most typified the analytical path among the Confucians of the Song and Ming dynasties were Cheng Yichuan [1033-1108] and Master Zhu [Zhu Xi, 1130-1200]. As for Lu Xiangshan [1139-1193], he took the non-analytical path, which prompted Master Zhu to describe him as Chan. Actually, Lu Xiangshan is not Chan. His content is not Chan nor is his method entirely Chan. If, because the Chan school used the non-analytical mode and Lu Xiangshan in certain respects also used the non-analytical mode of discourse to explain *lixue*,

we then conclude that Lu Xiangshan belongs to the Chan school, that would be incorrect. For although Lu Xiangshan also used the non-analytical mode, he was not entirely in the non-analytical mode of discourse. Here there is a difference between him and the Chan school. Thus we cannot make a blanket statement to the effect that Lu Xiangshan used the Chan method. We should ponder carefully what it was in his use of the non-analytical mode that made Master Zhu associate him with Chan. Of course Master Zhu's criticism of Lu Xiangshan as Chan was inaccurate. But on a certain level, Master Zhu's associating him with Chan is not without reason. But an association is still just an association; it is not a fact. If we say that the mode Lu Xiangshan adopted was the Chan mode, but his content was Confucianism, this kind of distinction is still inadequate. For although Lu Xiangshan used the non-analytical mode in some respects, in other respects he still used the analytical mode, and this was different from the Chan mode.

Thus we must know precisely on what occasion Lu Xiangshan's thought was expressed in the non-analytical mode and was different from the Chan mode. For Lu Xiangshan's thought had Mencius [371?-289? BCE] as its foundation.¹⁴ His basic doctrine and basic principles are to be found in Mencius. Having affirmed the principles of Mencius, he felt that if one wanted to distinguish "seeing Dao" from "not seeing Dao", one had only to study Mencius carefully. It was unnecessary for him to repeat him. Ordinarily when we talk of someone continuing another philosopher's thought, it means that it can be continued in the analytical mode. If we do not re-establish that thought but simply study it so that we can really understand it, then that is also a way of continuing the thought. From Lu Xiangshan's perspective, since Mencius had already explained many principles very clearly, it was unnecessary for him, Lu, to expend a great number of words in explaining it all over again. Thus Mencius's analysis was in this respect his, Lu's, own analysis, and Mencius's analytical discourse his own analytical discourse. It is then clear that Lu Xiangshan may be said to have also used analytical discourse. For example: "First establish the great." What do we mean by the great? What do we mean by the small? What is *ben xin* [original mind], *xing shan* [human nature is good], *ren yi nei zai* [humanity and duty are within], *hao ran zhi qi* [floodlike energy], and so on. Aren't these all explained very clearly in Mencius? Lu Xiangshan assumed these as his own fundamental thought, and from this standpoint they were his analytical discourse. And this is precisely where he rose above the multitude.

People usually feel that Confucius and Mencius did not explain enough and so they must explain it all over again. But the result is not necessarily better than Confucius and Mencius; in fact it may even be wrong.

Then on what occasions did Lu Xiangshan use non-analytical discourse? He used non-analytical discourse on the particular occasion when he “wanted to turn around Zhu Zi’s branching off.” He felt that Zhu Zi had taken a wrong path and so he wanted to bring him back to Mencius. That is why he clearly differentiates “seeing Dao” or “not seeing Dao”. Seeing Dao [*jian dao*] meant understanding Mencius. Not understanding Mencius, or departing from him and taking a wrong turn, was called not seeing Dao. That is why he felt that, even though Master Zhu was so eloquent and so abstruse, he failed to see Dao. The Dao that Mencius spoke of was not a vaguely metaphysical *Tai Ji* [Great Ultimate]. To put it nakedly, if one can understand the autonomy of the will, as Kant put it, then one can be said to see Dao. If one cannot understand the autonomy of the will, then even if one talks a great deal about Plato’s philosophy, about God, about empiricism or utilitarianism, none of it would count as seeing Dao. Isn’t that quite clear? In other words, only when one understands how moral law is established can that be counted as seeing Dao. If you cannot understand this, but hold that morality is built on God or metaphysical perfection or on happiness, that must be, according to Kant, entirely counted as heteronomy. A heteronomous morality is deviant, and deviation is branching off [*zhili*], and this is what Lu Xiangshan meant when he said that Master Zhu’s thought was deviant.

In general deviation leads us to talk about fragmentation, but this is an extension of the word, not the original meaning of *zhili*. *Zhi* is branch and *zhili* is departure from the trunk. Thus *zhili* is not a matter of fragmentation but a matter of being on the mark or not, of deviating or not. If moral law is determined on the basis of God, happiness, or metaphysical perfection, then all of it is *zhili*, deviant. This is also what Kant meant when he spoke of the heteronomy of the will, and, according to Lu Xiangshan, this is not seeing Dao.

What Mencius meant when he spoke of “[Human] nature is good” and “First establish the great” is simply the same as to see Dao, whereas to talk about the metaphysical Dao [*Daoti*, Dao-substance] does not necessarily make one see Dao. Master Zhu emphasized the metaphysical Great Ultimate [*Tai Ji*]. In the debate on the *Explanation of the Tai Ji Diagram* [*Tai Ji Tu Shuo*] Lu Xiangshan was defeated. But even though defeated, he saw Dao. To

him, Master Zhu spoke about *Tai Ji* beautifully but he was still unable to see Dao. Was such a judgment dogmatic?

This cannot be counted as dogmatic, because that was the doctrine established by the Sage. Master Zhu's teachings on the other hand were only chatter to while away the time and could not be counted as seeing Dao. Here Lu Xiangshan swiftly turned around Master Zhu's deviation, enabling us to return to Mencius. This turning-around must be accounted for scrupulously, without any vagueness, for Master Zhu was very abstruse and subtle in his teaching that the whole cosmic body is *Tai Ji* [Great Ultimate], all things one *Tai Ji*, and he would certainly not concede that he did not see Dao. By the same token, if we do not understand Lu Xiangshan's doctrine, we would not be able to accept Lu Xiangshan's criticism that Master Zhu was unable to see Dao. If we really understand it, then it would be impossible for us not to agree with Lu Xiangshan's criticism.

Lu Xiangshan was very clear about Dao in his mind. He held that Dao resided at the place Confucius called "*ren*" [humanity]. It also lay in what Mencius called "original mind," "human nature is good," and "humanity and duty are within."¹⁵ That is why he said that all those utterances of Master Zhu were merely "tongue-chewing that stuck to the teeth."¹⁶ He looked upon Confucius and Mencius as sages. Why don't you carefully study the doctrine of the sages? He wanted to turn the thought of Zhu Zi back to Mencius. He felt that once you have returned to Mencius it is enough simply to study him earnestly. No other explanations are necessary. He understood completely Master Zhu's elaborate teachings, viewing them as merely tongue-chewing, superfluous, and "setting up another kitchen." For example, when Zhu Zi annotated the *Analects*, he said that although there was nothing the Sage did not know, he nonetheless asked questions about everything when he visited the Great Temple, which showed how reverent and cautious the Sage was. Lu Xiangshan regarded this as another example of Master Zhu introducing a new interpretation. He was mocking Master Zhu's propensity for new interpretations. That is why I have often said that the moral norms and constants [*lunchang*] that Confucianism speaks of, such as the duty of ruler to be ruler, of minister to be minister, of father to be father and of son to be son are not theory, nor dogma, but fact and truth. When we say that there is nothing the Sage does not know, we mean that there is no heavenly principle he does not know. How can he know everything there is to know in empirical knowledge? To know is to know, not to know is not to know,

and if you do not know you should ask. That is a heavenly principle. And that is the sort of heavenly truth the Sage knows. That is why Lu Xiangshan criticized Master Zhu for wanting to set up another kitchen, establish another interpretation, which was simply a redundancy. That amounted to tongue-chewing that stuck to the teeth, or to put it more elegantly, “the discursive path 議論之途 [*yilun zhi tu*].”

According to Lu Xiangshan’s distinction, knowledge can be divided into two paths, the debate-and-discussion [*yi lun*] path and the plain-and-solid [*pu shi* 樸實] path.¹⁷ As soon as there is discourse it will not be plain and solid but will be like raising earth on the level ground. Originally the real fact and the real principle are plain and real. The minute discourse occurs it will be like “waves rising without wind,” “mediocre people disturbing themselves.” Lu Xiangshan’s criticism of Master Zhu’s thought as the discursive path is itself still analytical discourse. Its purpose was to distinguish what was the discursive path and what was the plain and solid path. But if one really wants to talk about the Confucian doctrine of the sage-within [*nei sheng*] or of moral practice, one cannot tread the discursive path, for that is deviating, branching off, and will not let one see Dao. The plain and solid path that Lu Xiangshan spoke of is not a broad and general plain and solid but, where seeing Dao is concerned, refers to a plain and solid based on real fact and real principles which in turn are based on the Dao of Mencius. It is, namely, the “openly clear.” That is why Lu Xiangshan emphasized *yijian gongfu* 易簡工夫, cultivation of, and discipline in, simplicity.¹⁸ This real fact and real principles are not those of empirical science but refer to the real facts and real principles of moral practice. Morally one must be steadfast and one must take up action. Hence it is called the plain and solid path. One’s life ought not to be enmeshed in discussion or idle tongue-wagging. That is what Lu Xiangshan meant by plain and solid. I have described this plain and solid as “*shengyi pushi* 勝義樸實” [the ultimate plain and solid],¹⁹ borrowing the “*shengyi*, ultimate,” of Buddhist Ultimate Reality.

Here I am reminded of the scholarship in philology [*kaoju* 考據, evidential research] that was in vogue during the reigns of the Qianlong [1736-1796] and Jiaqing [1796-1821] emperors. They called themselves “the Plain Learning.” They were, however, really not plain but thoroughly on the discursive path. They regarded themselves as the Plain School of Learning, criticizing the *lixue* [Rationalism, Neo-Confucianism] of the Song and Ming

dynasties as the not-plain learning, as being empty and thin. On a certain level one could say that Song-Ming learning [Neo-Confucianism] was empty and thin because it did not have such works as the *Shuo Wen* 說文 or *Er Ya* 爾雅 [two dictionaries], and that it was merely a lot of chatter. And because of that, people in general believed that only the philology of the Qianlong and Jiaqing reigns could be called *pu xue* [Plain Learning], and hence it became a universal norm. They had completely forgotten Lu Xiangshan's statements about the "plain and solid path." Because people failed to pay attention to these words, they got seduced by the Plain Learning of the Qianlong and Jiaqing periods. I honestly feel that, if we are talking about fact and truth and man's real existence, what Lu Xiangshan called *pushi*, plain and solid, was the real Plain Learning. Although *Shuo Wen* and *Er Ya* can increase our knowledge of etymology, how can we call them real Plain Learning? It can only be an example of what Lao Zi called "In cultivating learning there is daily increase...." [*Weixue ri yi* 為學日益]. For since the object of Song and Ming *lixue* was *wei dao* [cultivating Dao] these latter-day people inevitably exemplified "In cultivating Dao there is daily decrease" [*weidao ri sun* 為道日損]. Because of this, Lu Xiangshan wanted to teach "the simple-and-easy [*jianyi* 簡易]". The simple-and-easy cannot be used everywhere; it depends on the question at hand. Kant, who also talked about simplicity, made a statement that was very clear, and which I was very glad to see. He said that if a man acts according to the principle of autonomy, what he ought or ought not do would be clear to everyone, even to the fool. That is quite clear. If he acts in accordance to the principle of heteronomy, then he must rely on his knowledge of the world, in which case what he ought or ought not do cannot always be known even to the sage, much less to the fool.²⁰ What Kant meant here was precisely what Lu Xiangshan meant by simplicity. Thus simplicity was not only taught by Lu Xiangshan but advocated by Kant when he talked about moral practice. Kant's words can lead us to a further understanding of what Lu Xiangshan meant by simplicity. For otherwise something so broad would be difficult to understand.

Lu Xiangshan criticized Master Zhu's thought as treading the discursive path and he tried to bring him back to Mencius. But in the process of doing so he did not use analytical discourse. What he used was a non-analytical mode similar to the peremptory rebuke of a sudden whack on the head, his purpose being to turn around the orientation of Master Zhu's thought. The non-analytical mode used in this re-orientation was misunderstood by Master

Zhu as being Chan [Zen]. He thought Lu Xiangshan was using the Chan mode of “not giving away the clue,” and “a whack on the head.” That is why when someone asked Master Zhu why he described Lu Xiangshan as being Chan, Master Zhu replied: “The statements of Zijing 子靜 [Lu Xiangshan] are often bright at the two ends and dark in between [子靜說話常是兩頭明，中間暗。].” When asked how was it dark, Master Zhu answered: “That’s where he won’t give it away. By not giving it away he is being Chan....[他是那不說破處。他所以不說破，便是禪].”²¹ ...The two ends being bright referred to the one end where Mencius saw Dao, and the other end where Master Zhu could not see Dao. Master Zhu acknowledged Lu Xiangshan’s criticism of him. That is why he felt that the side where Lu Xiangshan criticized him and the side where he was being led back to Mencius were both very clear. Hence the two ends being bright. But Master Zhu felt that in the process of turning him around back to Mencius, Lu Xiangshan did not make himself clear; hence the darkness in the middle. However, from Lu Xiangshan’s viewpoint, Mencius had explained it all very clearly and all one had to do was to read him carefully. So on an occasion such as this Master Zhu criticized Lu Xiangshan as being Chan, a criticism to which Lu Xiangshan of course could not bow. His main purpose was to correct Master Zhu’s flaw, and since Master Zhu acknowledged his error, that would do. Whether the rest had to be explained was indeterminate. If one wanted to see Dao, one simply had to make a solid study of the *Analects* and *Mencius*. On this question Master Zhu could of course also retort: “But I do read the *Analects* and *Mencius* everyday! Didn’t I annotate the *Four Books*?” To Lu Xiangshan, however, Master Zhu’s annotations were completely beside the point. Those annotations had to be relinquished. We had to bring ourselves back to our own mind and nature and talk about the *Analects* and *Mencius* existentially. Then we would naturally see Dao.

Continuing along the lines of what we said previously, we have, through an objective analysis, determined that Master Zhu’s criticism of Lu Xiangshan as being Chan was wide of the mark. Lu Xiangshan did indeed use the non-analytical mode, which led to Master Zhu’s mistaken association. Since it is an association, it cannot be a very strict and accurate judgment. Strictly speaking, the non-analytical mode employed by Lu Xiangshan is not quite the non-analytical discourse of the Chan school. Besides, he enunciated a doctrine and

still belonged to analytical discourse. First he established what Dao was, and what seeing Dao was, and what not seeing Dao was. In other words, he first established his criterion, then turned around the not seeing Dao back to seeing Dao. So it is by no means an easy task to find an exemplar of non-analytical discourse in Chinese thought. There are not many of them. Only Zhuang Zi's method has a strong non-analytical flavor. To do this kind of evaluation, we must first gain a thorough understanding of each thinker, especially his important statements. These are not blind interpolations thought up out of a vacuum. Thus the evaluation that we make in this way after a careful understanding of the subject will be broadly on-target and not excessive.

A truly self-conscious use of analytical discourse and non-analytical discourse started only with Buddhism. Traditional Confucian thought seldom touched upon this question. Śākyamuni's earlier discourse was analytical, although he also used non-analytical discourse. After Śākyamuni achieved Dao he preached for another forty-nine years. This can be divided into five periods.²² In the fourth period, when he spoke of *prajñā* he used non-analytical discourse. In the first, second, third, and fifth periods, he used analytical discourse. That is why in the past when great monks wanted to evaluate and classify doctrine they had to first of all understand the special character of the *prajñā* sūtras [Wisdom sūtras]. Only then could they go on to evaluate and classify doctrine.

The character of the *prajñā* sūtra is to *rongtong taotai* 融通淘汰 [thoroughly dissolve and wash out], to digest the principles that were previously explained analytically. This digesting was different from Hegel's digesting. Hegel's digesting was to dialectically integrate what had been expressed analytically, which is an extreme form of digesting. The *prajñā* sūtra's digesting does not synthesize the principles established analytically. Instead its method is to "thoroughly dissolve and wash out" [*rongtong taotai*]. Thus it does not establish anything. It is unlike Hegel, who established a great system through dialectical unification. *Prajñā* dissolves for the purpose of removing attachment. It is thus a negative approach. *Rong* is *ronghua* [melt, dissolve]; *tong* is *tongda* [connect through]. *Rongtong*, dissolve through, does not represent unification, but aims at dissolving attachment and boundary limitations [*fengxian*]. For any concept that is established through analytical discourse has limitation. Once it is limited, people will go along with this limitation and form attachment. This is what is called *fengxian*, boundary limitation. This is the *feng* 封 of

the "Equality of Things" chapter in *Zhuang Zi* which says: “Dao has never been bounded [*feng*]; words have never been constant [夫道未始有封，言未始有常].” To wash out means to get rid of attachment. Thus to dissolve through and wash out is to dissolve limitations and remove attachment, in other words, to remove the maladies of living beings. Thus the aim of dissolving through and washing out is to return to the Real Character [Ch. *shixiang* 實相, real characteristic, realness, ultimate reality] of all dharmas [all phenomena]. It is not to integrate everything into a great system. That is why it is different from Hegel’s dialectical thought. This is the distinctive character of the *prajñā* sūtra.

Likewise if we wish to understand Zhuang Zi’s thought. Starting from the opposition of right and wrong, Zhuang Zi succeeds in transcending right and wrong. This is not saying that there is an A and a B and then they are synthesized.²³ That is why Eastern thought has its unique character. We should not subsume it under Hegel’s dialectical thought just because it also talks about digesting and dialectics.

Previously we have said that the *prajñā* sūtra’s dissolving through and washing out is aimed at dissolving determinations [*xiang*] and eliminating attachment in order that the dharmas may return to their Realness [*shi xiang*, real form, real characteristic, ultimate reality]. Then what is Realness? “Realness is Oneness, which is called Noneness, is simply Suchness [*shi xiang yi xiang, suo wei wu xiang, ji shi ru xiang* 實相一相，所謂無相，即是如相。Also, Realness or Oneness, so-called Noneness, is simply Suchness].” The *prajñā* sūtra does not remove the dharmas discussed in analytical discourse. It only dissolves the attachment to things. As soon as attachment is removed then every dharma immediately becomes Such/Thus [*ru*], and every dharma is [its] Realness [*shi xiang*]. That is why the *Lotus Sūtra* [Ch. *Fa hua jing*, Skt. *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra*] says: “Only Buddha and Buddha can reach the ultimate Suchness of dharmas.” So the *prajñā* sūtra contains nothing, says nothing, and establishes nothing. That is why the *prajñā* sūtra says: “Not a single dharma can be obtained.” For standing from the position of the *prajñā* sūtra, certainly not a single dharma can be obtained. But from the standpoint of analytical discourse there are numerous dharmas and systems, which is naturally different from the spirit of the *prajñā* sūtra. Buddha has said: “I have preached for forty-nine years but there is not a single thing to preach [說法四十九年，而無一可說].” The former refers to the analytical discourse of

the various scriptures of Mahayana and Hinayana, while the latter refers to the *prajñā* spirit of dissolving through and washing out. Buddha uses this paradoxical statement to allude to analytical discourse and non-analytical discourse.

The Buddhist *prajñā* sutra preaches by means of other different doors to enlightenment [*yi famen*].²⁴ “*Yi*” means peculiar or different. In other words, Buddha preaches in the *prajñā* sūtra in a different way from his preachings in the other Hinayana and Mahayana scriptures. Not only is it different, but there are distinctive characteristics. Buddha said that the other Mahayana and Hinayana scriptures can be preached using one door to enlightenment, two doors to enlightenment, three doors to enlightenment, up to an infinite number of doors to enlightenment. For example, when explaining the Four Truths the four doors to enlightenment are used. When explaining the Five Aggregates [five *skandhas*, five physical and mental constituents of a person], Six Ways to Salvation [six *pāramitās*], Eight Right Paths, and Twelve Dependent Causes [twelve *nidānas*], etc., doors of the same number are used. All these are analytical discourse. According to the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra* of Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva, all these dharmas of analytical discourse are disputable dharmas. Being disputable, they have no logical necessity, all of them expedient dharmas. This is an instance of the subtle versatility of Śākyamuni’s wisdom. As to teaching the *prajñā* sūtra, it teaches nothing and establishes no principle, the purpose being to enable all the previously taught expedient dharmas to return to Suchness. And Realness or Oneness, which is called Noneness, is simply Suchness. The dharmas taught here are non-disputable dharmas and therefore have logical necessity. These are not expediently taught dharmas of convenience. Different [distinctive] doors to enlightenment actually refer to the doors to enlightenment of non-analytical discourse. Thus Buddha said that the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra* is a door to enlightenment that uses non-analytical discourse. And this is what makes the *prajñā* sūtra unique.

Prajñā is after all a kind of presentation which cannot be explained by means of a concept. That is why Buddha used the non-analytical mode to reveal *prajñā* Wisdom, a mode that closely resembles Zhuang Zi’s method. Suppose we ask, What is *prajñā*? In the *prajñā* sūtras Buddha does not answer this in terms of “what.” He uses the paradoxical method of dialectics to express it. Thus the sūtra says: “Buddha says ‘*Prajñā pāramitā* [salvation through Wisdom, perfection of Wisdom] is not *prajñā pāramitā*-- that is *prajñā*

pāramitā.”²⁵ This is not an analytical mode of teaching, but a demonstration through negation. This method of expression consists of a dialectical paradox. This kind of paradox indicates to us that *prajñā* is a Wisdom found in our real life which reveals itself from the Subject after passing through real existential feelings. It cannot be analyzed through language or by means of concepts. For if we are told what *prajñā* is, then *prajñā* is only a concept, and if we follow this concept then it is very easy to become attached to this concept and then our thought falls into delusions. Once we fall into attachment and delusion, *prajñā* Wisdom will never unfold.

Thus although the *prajñā* sūtra can obtain no dharma and can establish no dharma Buddha can use his wisdom to make use of non-analytical discourse to unfold real *prajñā* before us, and this is the “Suchness *prajñā* [*shixiang bore* 實相般若].” Buddha’s use of this different door to express his doctrine belongs to second-order preaching. He is using non-analytical discourse to reveal Suchness *prajñā*. And Suchness *prajñā* is Noneness and has nothing. Thus Buddha says that the purpose of *prajñā* is to dissolve the attachments of living beings, enabling them to return to the Realness of things. Therefore if one understands clearly Buddha’s intent in explaining the *prajñā* sūtra, then all his words may be dissolved. This is like tearing down the bridge when one has crossed it. Looking at *prajñā* sūtras from a higher level, *prajñā* is also a teaching. But as soon as one understands the Realness of dharmas, then this method of teaching also gets dissolved. Thus this kind of non-analytical discourse and the analytical method of establishing a doctrine are different. This is similar to Zhuang Zi’s saying in the “Equality of Things” chapter: “Since it is one, can there be speech? [既已為一矣，且得有言乎。]” This means that since it already is one, how can there be any speech? By this time there is already no speech. At the same time “Since I have said it is one, can there be no speech? [既已謂之一，且得無言乎].” This means that since I have said it is one, this is a kind of speech, so can there be no speech? “Is one” is speaking from the perspective of objective reality [*shixiang*]. “Said it is one” is speaking from the perspective of subjective speech. Subjective speech has no independent meaning, its function being to understand objective reality. Once objective reality is understood, then speech may be dissolved. This kind of dissolving is not the same as subjective unification, and should not be confused with Hegel’s dialectical unification.

Thus the *prajñā*-Realness that is revealed by means of non-analytical discourse is non-disputable dharma. It is not a concept established by analytical discourse. It is the Such/Thus [*ru*] and Realness [*shi xiang*] of all dharmas and not the Such and Realness of our concepts. It must be confirmed by wisdom. This is the Thus Thus/Such Such [*rushi rushi*] of human life, this Such Such must be presented through the "existentialist path" of existentialism, and cannot be taught by the theoretical mode.

Continuing along these lines, we know the *prajñā* sūtra's unique character, which is the non-disputable dharma of non-analytical discourse. But merely the non-disputable dharma of *prajñā* is still not what the Tiantai sect means by Perfect Teaching. That is why in my book *Foxing yu Bore* [*Buddha-nature and Prajñā*] I repeatedly say that *prajñā pāramitā* [the perfection of wisdom] also contains all dharmas. But that basically is *prajñā* "functionally fully containing all dharmas", and looking at the perfect from this standpoint, we can only call it the functional perfect. This is what I have described in the last lecture, what Western translators have called round, as in round teaching. This round refers to the round of "perfectly [roundedly] penetrating without obstruction [*yuantong wu'ai*, 圓通無礙],." This is not the real Perfect Teaching. The *yuantong wu'ai* in *prajñā* is only a common shared dharma, for it is essential to the teaching of both Mahayana and Hinayana. That is why the Tiantai school differentiates out a Perfect Teaching distinct from the *prajñā* Kong [Emptiness, Skt. Śūnyatā, Madyamaka] school, for the Tiantai school and the Kong school are ultimately different. The Perfect Teaching of Tiantai is not determined on the basis of subjective *prajñā* but on the basis of the objective dharmas. The subjective *prajñā* is function [*yong*], in other words "The subtlety of operation lies in the mind. [運用之妙，存乎一心。]" This *prajñā* Wisdom can of course be described as perfectly penetrating without obstruction, but it is not the basis of the perfect meant by the Tiantai school. *Prajñā* Wisdom can only be considered as the "woof" of Perfect Teaching, whereas the perfection of the Tiantai doctrine is defined by the "warp" and "tie [*gang*]." In other words, it is defined by the question of the existence of all dharmas [i.e., of the phenomenal, empirical world].

Perfect Teaching is not defined by the marvelous function of the subjective *prajñā* Wisdom because this is common to both Mahayana and Hinayana. To explain why Perfect Teaching is perfect, we must approach it from the objective side of the existence of dharmas. That means we have to explain the existence of all dharmas on the basis of the Buddha-

nature [*buddhata*, potential for becoming a Buddha]. Why do we have to start with the Buddha-nature [*foxing*]? Because in the cultivation of right practice what we are concerned with is: Exactly in what way can we attain Buddhahood? And when we attain Buddhahood, what state of Buddhahood will it be? For example, the Buddhahood that the self-salvation man [*zi liao han*, Skt. *pratyekabuddha*] of Hinayana realizes does not encompass all the dharmas of all the other sentient beings. In other words, all the other dharmas have not entered into the Buddhahood of the self-salvation man, which means that they have not entered the Buddha-nature. Therefore this Buddha-nature has not included all the other dharmas. That is why it was necessary to advance from Hinayana to Mahayana. The Mahayana Buddha is conditioned on the possibility of all sentient beings being able to attain salvation. The Mahayana Buddha cannot leave behind all the dharmas of all the sentient beings, but must absorb all dharmas completely into his Buddhahood and Buddha-Nature. Even so, there are many ways of explaining the Mahayana Buddha. There is the Mahayana Common Doctrine [*tong jiao*, Shared, Interpenetrating Doctrine] of Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva, which is different from the *prajñā* common shared teaching. There are also the *ālaya* and Buddha-Womb [*tathagata-garbha*] systems of teaching. These are all Mahayana Buddhism. They all have the condition that all sentient beings must attain salvation, which is different from the self-salvation of Hinayana. According to the critique and classification of Buddha's teachings by the Tiantai school, they are still not the ultimate Perfect Teaching.

The existence of dharmas that the Tiantai school speaks of when it evaluates the Mahayana Common Doctrine is confined to the Three Realms [of desire, the material, and the non-material [Ch. *san jie* , Skt. *tridhātu*].²⁶ That is to say, the doctrine that Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva teaches has, except for *prajñā*, special constraints in regard to the questions of the existence of dharmas and the Buddha-Nature. These constraints reveal its interconnections with Hinayana, not in regard to *prajñā* but in regard to the Buddha-Nature. Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva's teaching is confined to the Three Realms, which means that according to his teaching the existence of dharmas is restricted to the sixth *viññāna* [sixth consciousness]. The seventh *viññāna* and eighth *viññāna* are not explained. This reveals the limitation of the dharmas that he taught, and this limitation is similar to the limitation of the Hinayana. That is why it is called Interpenetrating Doctrine [Shared, Common Doctrine], for it is connected to Hinayana.

Advancing from the Common [Interpenetrating] Doctrine to the *ālaya vijñāna* [storehouse consciousness] system of the seventh and eighth *vijñānas*, the existence of dharmas move outside the Three Realms. Although it has moved beyond the Three Realms, this can only explain the dharmas of life, death, and transmigration, but is incomplete in explaining pure dharmas. Besides, it explains by means of psychological analysis, which is the path of empirical analysis. Whenever analytical means is used to teach, that is not Perfect Teaching. Even if the teaching has reached beyond the Three Realms, it is still not the ultimate Perfect Teaching.

From this we enter once more into the system of the Buddha-Womb Self-Existent Pure Mind . Not only can this system explain in detail the cycle of birth, death, and transmigration, but it can also give a clear account of pure dharmas. This can be called very perfect. But the Tiantai school still judges it to be Mahayana Special Doctrine and not Perfect Teaching because the Buddha-Womb system still follows the analytical path; that is, it uses a transcendental analytic to explain the question of the existence of all dharmas. It is a transcendental analysis, to be sure, but as long as the existence of all dharmas is explained analytically, it cannot be Perfect Teaching. For as soon as the question of the existence of dharmas is explained analytically, then it is a specially defined system; and since it is a specially defined system, then it has the restricted limited form of a system. Therefore regardless of whether it is an *ālaya* system or a Buddha-Womb system, it has its restrictions. And precisely because it is explained analytically and has the restrictions of a system, the Tiantai school criticizes Mahayana Special Doctrine as “winding and roundabout, and awkward in its origin.”²⁷ Since it is roundabout and clumsy it naturally cannot be Perfect Teaching.

So if one wishes to really express Perfect Teaching, one must do so by non-analytical means. To use non-analytical means to speak of Perfect Teaching in terms of the existence of dharmas is not the same as Buddha using non-analytical means to express *prajñā*. Since one is speaking in terms of the existence of dharmas, there is something to speak about, and therefore it is still a doctrine. And if it is a doctrine, it is a system, but one without system characteristic [*xitong xiang*]. It is a system because it speaks in terms of the Buddha-Nature and the existence of dharmas. But the means it uses is non-analytical and therefore it does not have the delimitation of a system. Since it is a system but without system-delimitation

[*xianding xiang* 限定相], then it is a paradox. And precisely because it is a system but without delimited form, it reveals the warp meaning of Perfect Teaching.²⁸ This Perfect Teaching is introduced by the *Lotus Sūtra*. Both the *Lotus Sūtra* and the *prajñā sūtra* have their distinctive characters. The *Lotus Sūtra* itself does not have any special content, its text being extremely simple, without any principles of analytical discourse. What then is special about the *Lotus Sūtra*? The main question in the *Lotus Sūtra* is its treatment of the “question of the expedient and the real.” Everything that is explained analytically is expedient [*quan* 權]. Everything that is explained non-analytically is real [*shi* 實]. How does it treat the question of the expedient and the real? According to the *Lotus Sūtra*, it does so by “Exposing [*kai*, opening] the expedient and revealing the real.” *Kai*, opening, is *kaijue* 開決, break open, meaning break through. This may be compared to the *rongtong taotai* [thoroughly dissolve and wash out] of the *prajñā sūtra* but is actually different. *Jueliao* 決了 [break through],” is in Kant’s terminology critical examination. In Buddhist terminology it is a kind of *jueze* 抉擇 [decision-taking], in other words, criticism, judgment, and decision on all dharmas/principles previously discussed. Is this not a “critical examination”?

Thus "*jueliao* [break through],” means to enable us to decide and reach through. For example, Buddha says that the dharmas [teachings] of Hinayana are only an expedient doctrine. We must not be stuck or attached to them; otherwise we will always be in Hinayana. For when Buddha preached the dharmas of Hinayana he was not only telling sentient beings merely to be *arhats*. That is why if sentient beings can break through the Hinayana method, they will know immediately that Buddha-dharma [Buddha's teachings] is right there.²⁹ This Hinayana method is also a door to becoming Buddha. That is why Buddhism says “All dharmas are Buddha-dharma.” All dharmas, such as mathematics, medical science, natural science, and so forth, can break through to Buddha. Every dharma is a door through which Buddha can be reached. This is a mental state after a breaking through. Without a breaking through, mathematics will only be a formal science. What relation has it got with becoming a Buddha? Physics will only be a physical science. What has it got to do with becoming a Buddha?

Therefore the purpose of “breaking through,” is to rid sentient beings of attachment and being sealed in. Once rid of attachment, Hinayana teaching becomes Buddha-dharma

and “Bowling one’s head and raising one’s hand all become the way of Buddha.”³⁰ Once the expedient is broken through, then there is the real right there. Hence the saying “Exposing the expedient and revealing the real.” Once this happens, walking, standing still, sitting, and lying down are all Buddha-dharma. This exposing the expedient and revealing the real is the original intent of Buddha. That is why the Tiantai school teaches the *Lotus Sūtra* as the main nexus of Buddhism. It is the main cord [*gang*] in terms of Buddha’s original intent and of exposing the expedient and revealing the real. In present-day terminology, it belongs to the second order. The other dharmas of analytical discourse are of the first order or the basic order. Once this is understood, then not only Hinayana dharma must be broken through, but the *ālaya* system and the Buddha-Womb system must also be broken through.

After the Tiantai school has broken through the various Mahayana and Hinayana, it explains the existence of all dharmas with “One thought-instant three thousand [*yi nian san qian*, encompass three thousand worlds in one thought-instant.]” “One thought–instant three thousand” is not explained by means of analytical discourse. The statement “One thought-instant three thousand” is equivalent to not giving an explanation for the existence of dharmas, but it has indicated the existence of dharmas and it is not to indicate *prajñā*. Thus the Tiantai school is different from the Kong school. “One thought-instant three thousand” is that which is taught after breaking through the Hinayana doctrine and the Common Doctrine that lies within the Three Realms as well as the *ālaya* and Buddha-Womb systems of the Realm Beyond the Three Realms [*jiwei*]. That is why this statement of the Tiantai school does not belong to the same level as the doctrines of Mahayana and Hinayana. It is an explanation on a higher level; it is non-analytical discourse and is equivalent to not explaining the existence of dharmas, whereas a lower-level explanation explains the existence of all dharmas by means of analytical discourse. The Tiantai school uses the non-analytical mode to break through all the dharmas of analytical discourse, and make them interpenetrating without obstruction. In this way, each dharma can be preserved and not a single dharma can be eliminated. Hence the statement that a bow of the head and a raise of the hand are all Buddha-dharma. Therefore one must identify with [*jiyu* , 即於] the Nine Dharma Realms³¹ to achieve Buddhahood. In attaining Buddhahood one cannot be separated from a single dharma. In this way the existence of all dharmas is preserved. Doctrine presented in this way through non-analytical discourse may be said to be a tautology. Since

it explains all dharmas by means of non-analytical discourse, it is a system but without system-characteristics. Being without system-characteristics, it cannot be disputed and this is what makes it Perfect Teaching. Once this realm of Perfect Teaching is reached, all dharmas are laid out flat-smooth, and all the big and small earthen bumps formed by expedient doctrines are now dissolved into flat ground. This kind of Perfect Teaching is no longer an alternative system, has no longer a specifically defined system-characteristic, and hence cannot be disputed. This non-disputability is seen in terms of the *Lotus Sūtra* and belongs to the warp of Perfect Teaching. Adding the non-disputable dharma of the *Lotus Sūtra* to the non-disputable dharma of the *Prajñā sūtra*, one the warp, one the woof, thus joining two non-disputable dharmas, gives Perfect Teaching.

From this we may see that there is a special pattern in the Tiantai school's definition of Perfect Teaching. This is a very subtle form of thought. For if it fell into an analytical system, discourse would be easier, whereas it is not easy to discourse within this special paradigm. This kind of question needs to be considered carefully by us all. First, we must understand what a "system" is. Once we have a clear understanding of a "system," then the meaning of "a system without system-characteristics" will make itself clear.

The Perfect Teaching taught by the Tiantai school cannot be separated from Expedient Teaching. The statement "Ghee skimmed from boiled butter cannot be separated from the previous four flavors"³² means that the flavor of such ghee is revealed through the previous four flavors. Similarly, Perfect Teaching cannot be separated from the previous three teachings. Thus attaining Buddhahood requires being joined to the other Nine Dharma-Realms of sentient beings, for not a single dharma may be eliminated. In this way the Buddha-Nature has assured the existence of all dharmas. This shows that unless Perfect Teaching is reached, the existence of dharmas cannot be assured. Looking at it from the standpoint of assuring the existence of all dharmas, I have described it with the term "Buddhistic ontology." Buddhism originally teaches no-substance, intending to get rid of "being," and has no such thing as ontology in its doctrine. But in terms of assuring the existence of dharmas by means of the Buddha-Nature and in terms of the necessity of the existence of dharmas, it has achieved a Buddhistic ontology. If we can describe it in this way, then it is similar to the freedom and natural harmony of the Kingdom of God described by Kant. The existence of dharmas that is referred to here belongs to nature and Buddha

belongs to freedom. This immediately suggests a question to us, the question of summum bonum, the highest good [*yuan shan*, perfect good]. The highest good [*yuan shan*] is something that cannot appear in Kant's philosophy. Kant can only affirm God to ensure it, and only then can the highest good be possible. However, in the Perfect Teaching of Buddhism there is a clear idea of the highest good, as clear as "pointing at my palm." This kind of realm of Perfect Teaching transcends the realm of Kant's philosophy. Can one really say that this is mysticism? But according to Kant's philosophy this kind of thought is mysticism. Kant maintained that we have no intuition of the Kingdom of God. Therefore we cannot intuit or concretize the kingdom of God. This natural world of ours can only be called a symbol of the kingdom of God, not a schema. But in fact, if we can reach a thorough understanding of Perfect Teaching, the schema that Kant spoke of cannot be applied here.

In regard to Perfect Teaching, Kant's speculations as to the highest good are not the final word. For since one becomes Buddha by being identical to the Nine Dharma Realms, namely hells, hungry spirits, beasts, etc., and can even attain Buddhahood by practising a bow of the head or a raise of the hand, then in this kind of realm, all dharmas are all leveled and this is where Buddha is revealed. In terms of Buddha, where virtue is, there is happiness. For in Perfect Teaching Buddha himself is virtue and the existence of dharmas is happiness. These two are forever together, and it would be questionable for us to continue to say at this point that virtue and happiness is a synthetic relation. For in the state of Perfect Teaching, there is no longer a synthetic relationship. There is only an analytic relationship.

It is thus very heuristic for Buddhism to introduce the question of Perfect Teaching. Although Kant also paid attention to the question of the relationship of virtue and happiness, his way of explaining it is, according to the critique and classification imposed by Buddhism, only a method of Separate Doctrine and not that of Perfect Teaching. A clear understanding of this question is found only in the Perfect Teaching of the Tiantai school. Kant's philosophy has not been able to arrive at a clear understanding of this problem.

Today I shall stop here. Next time we shall try to gain a further understanding of the question of Perfect Teaching.

Transcribed by Huey-jen You 尤惠貞

¹ See Mou Zongsan, *Foxing yu Bore* [Buddha-nature and Prajna](Taipei: Xuesheng Shuju, 1977), vol.,2, pp. 1187-1214.

² See Fung Yu-lan, *Zhongguo Zhexue Shi* [History of Chinese Philosophy](Shanghai: Shanghai Shudian, 1990) pp. 164-166.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 304.

⁴ See *Mencius* 7A.4.2.

⁵ *Mencius* 7B.25.7-8.

⁶ *Mencius* 7B.25.1: "Haosheng Buhai asked: 'What kind of a man is Lo Zhengzi?' Mencius replied: 'A good man. A real man.' 'What does good mean? What does real mean?' Mencius said: 'That which is desirable is called good. Having it oneself is called Real. He is filled with it is called beautiful. He is filled with it and it shines is called great. To be great and transformed is called sagely. To be sagely and unknowable is called divine. Among the second kind of men Lo Zhengzi ranks in the middle, and among the fourth kind of men he ranks at the bottom.'"

⁷ See Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva's *Zhong guan lun* [Mulamādhyaṃaka-karika], "Yinyuan" chapter.

⁸ See *Dacheng Qixin Lun* [Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna]: "Why do empirical influence give rise to pure dharmas ceaselessly? It is because there is Real Such [zhenru真如, Real Thus] dharmas which can influence ignorance [avidyā]. Because of the power of empirical influence, they make the illusory mind [wangxin妄心] loathe the pain of living and dying, and desire to seek nirvana.... There are two kinds of Real Such influences. What are the two? First, the influence of self-substance forms; second, functional influence. The influence of self-substance form means that since before the beginning of time, humans have had non-leaking [undefiled, pure] dharmas which has the nature of inapprehensible karma which creates phenomena [you busiyi ye zo jingjie zhi xing 有不思議業作境界之性]. According to these two meanings pure dharmas constantly influence ignorance. Because of their strength, they can cause sentient beings to loathe the suffering of living and dying, and desire nirvana, and to believe that they themselves have Real Such dharmas and so resolve to enter into the practice of achieving nirvana.

⁹ *Dao De Jing*, chapter 1.

¹⁰ *Dao De Jing*, ch. 1.

¹² The Eight Right Paths refer to, first, right views; second, right thought and purpose [right insights]; third, right speech; fourth, right action; fifth, right livelihood [or occupation]; sixth, right zeal [or energy in progressing towards nirvana]; seventh, right remembrance or memory; eighth, right meditation.

¹³ See *Zhuang Zi*, "On The Equality of Things" [Qi Wu Lun] chapter.

¹⁴ See Mou Zongsan, *Cong Lu Xiangshan dao Liu Jishan* [From Lu Xiangshan to Liu Jishan] (Taipei: Xuesheng Shuju, 1979), pp. 3-5, "Yulu Xuanlu [Selected Dialogues]" 41: "Fuming 阜民 once asked: 'Did you, sir, receive your knowledge from a master?' He answered: 'I got it myself by reading Mencius.'"

¹⁵ *Op.cit.*, page 68. "Yulu Xuanlu", 7: "The Master [Confucius] illuminated this Dao through *ren* [humanity], his words of one piece without seams. Mencius expatiated on it, making it even more transparent. For the times were different."

¹⁶ *Op.cit.*, page 70, "Yulu Xuanlu", 23: "The Master said: 'Those in later ages who spoke about Dao were just chewing the tongue and sticking to the teeth. My words on Dao are open and clear, with none of that tongue-chewing and teeth-sticking. That is why they are easy to understand and easy to practice.'

¹⁷ Mou, *Cong Lu Xiangshan dao Liu Jishan*, 35-36. "Fu Jilu said: 'The Master lived in the mountains and often told his students: 'Your ears can naturally hear, your eyes can naturally see, in serving your father you are naturally filial, in serving your older brother you have a younger brother's respect. There is originally no lack of these and you do not need to look elsewhere for them. All you have to do is to stand yourself up.' Most of the students were inspired by this. To those who gave argument, the Master said: 'Your words are empty. They are just the opinions of the present culture.' He often said: 'At present everyone under heaven have two paths before them, that of simple honesty and that of argumentation.'"

¹⁸*Op. cit.*, pp. 31-32. "At the meeting at E Hu [Goose Lake], Lu Xiangshan composed a poem in response to his older brother which said: "Ruins and graves, rise and decay, ancestral temple's august presence. This man, does not a thousand ages wear down his heart with sorrow? Rivulet trickling into deep cold water. Fist-size stones piling high into the peaks of Tai and Hua. So too practice of the plain and simple becomes great in time. Careers of distracting detail are in the end fleeting as rise and fall of waves. To know how to ascend to high places, distinguish first between real and false right now."

¹⁹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 36-37.

²⁰ *Op. cit.*, pp. 8-9.

²¹ *Op. cit.*, p.56 and p.196.

²² The five periods of Buddha's teaching are: first, the *Huayan* [Garland] period, and the teaching of the *Huayan jing* [*Avatamsaka-sūtra*, *Garland Sūtra*]; second, the Deer Park period, and the teaching of the four *āgamas* [scriptures]; third, the period of universal [*vaipulya*] doctrines, and the teaching of such universal doctrines as the Mahāyāna sūtras, including the *Vimalakīrti*, *Viṣeṣacintābrahmapariṣecchā* [*Questions from Brahma*], *Lankāvatāra* [*Descent to the Island of Lanka*], *Miyan* [*Esoteric*], *Samādhi* [*Meditation*], *Suvarṇa* [*Golden Light*], and *Srīmālā-devī-simhanāda* [*Queen Srimala*] sūtras; fourth, the *prajñā* period, and the teaching of the *prajñā* sūtras; fifth, the Lotus-Nirvana period and the teaching of the *Lotus* and *Nirvāṇa* sūtras. See Mou, *Foxing yu Bore*, vol. 2, ch.1, sect. 3, "Wu Shi Ba Jiao"[The Five Periods and Eight Teachings].

²³ See *Zhuang Zi* 2, "The Equality of Things [Qi Wu Lun]": "All things are that, all things are this.... This is also that, that is also this. That is also a true and false. This is also a true and false. Can there really be a that which is true? Can there really not be a that which is true? Where that and this do not have their mates, there is the so-called pivot of Dao. The pivot first gets its place in the center of the circle so as to be able to respond to infinite change. The right is an infinity. The wrong is also an infinity That is why it is said that nothing is better than illumination."

²⁴ See Long Shu [Nāgārjuna] Bodhisattva's *Da zhidu lun* [*Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra*], *juan* 1: "Therefore again, there are two kinds of teaching, one is disputable, one non-disputable. The disputable one has already been treated in other sūtras. Now because we want to teach the non-disputable, we will teach the *Prajñāpāramitā*-sūtras... Then again in the remaining sūtras Buddha teaches about the five aggregates [*skandhas*], the impermanence of things, suffering, emptiness, and the non-reality of the ego [*wu wo xiang* , Skt. *anatman*]. Because we now want to teach about the five aggregates through different methods, we will teach the *Prajñāpāramitā*-sūtras."

²⁵ See the *Jingang borebolomi jing* [*Diamond Sūtra*, *Vajracchedika-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra*].

²⁶ The Three Realms [*tridhātu*] refers to the realm of desire, the realm of the material, and the realm of the non-material. See Mou, *Foxing yu Bore*, vol. 2, chap. 4, sect. 8.1.

²⁷ *Fahua Xuanyi* [*The Hidden Meaning of the Lotus Sūtra*], *juan* 5A: "If I wish to go through the different ranks [of practitioners, bodhisattvas, Buddhas, etc.] to speak of the coarse and the subtle of the Teaching... the medium-sized grass (the two ranks of hearers and Solitary buddhas), although they try to rise above their ranks, their wisdom cannot reach the source of wisdom, and their coassion cannot reach other things and beings... . As for the big tree (the Separate, Distinctive Teaching, i.e., the *Huayan* [Garland], *Sūtra*), its meaning also depends on the Middle Doctrine, and its teachings all demolish ignorance and have effectiveness in reaching beyond those realms [of desire, form (the material), and formlessness (the non-material)], and so this rank is more subtle. But the Special Teaching enters through the Convenient Gate, its path curving and roundabout, following an awkward place, and thus its position is also crude. Perfect Teaching is the Real Gate, and so it is subtle." On "its path curving and roundabout, following an awkward place", see Mou, *Foxing and Bore*, vol. 1, pp. 560-561.

²⁸ The Tiantai school treats the *Lotus Sūtra* as the outline of Perfect Teaching. *Fahua Xuanyi*, *juan* 10A, "Shi Jiao Xiang [Interpretation of the Meaning of the Doctrine]" first introduces the "broad meaning" saying: "You ought to know that this sūtra only talks about Rulai [Buddha] giving an outline of his teaching, and is not giving the details."

²⁹ In *Fahua jing* [Lotus Sutra], *juan* 4, "Fashi Pin [Chapter on Preceptors]", a hymn says: "If you hear this profound sūtra you will understand and reject the dharmas of hearers [*śrāvakas*]. This is the king of all sūtras

and once you have heard it you will earnestly ponder it. You should know that those who do this are close to Buddha's wisdom."

³⁰See Mou , *Foxing yu Bore*, vol. 2, p. 598.

³¹ The Nine Dharma Realms refers to the six paths of hells, hungry spirits, beasts, titanic demons, humans, and deities, as well as the three realms of sages, namely hearers, solitary buddhas, and bodhisattvas.

³²The first four flavors refer to milk, cream, curds, butter. The liquor skimmed from boiled butter cannot stand out separate from these four flavors.