

## Lecture 13

### Two Truths and Three Substances: Where Do We Put Science?

In the last lecture we discussed a fundamental concept in Buddhism, “dependent-origination substance-empty” and some of the related philosophical issues, such as the theories of Kant [1724-1804] and Bradley [1846-1924]. The doctrinal principles of Buddhism are most complex and most heuristic, involving a tremendous number of philosophical issues. Besides “dependent-origination substance-empty,” there are several other major questions that we shall discuss in succession. This time, we shall follow “dependent-origination substance-empty” and look at the questions of Two Truths [*er di*, Skt. *satya-dvāya*,] and Three Substances [Ch. *san xing*, Skt. *tri-svabhāva*, Three Natures].

When the Kong school [Kong Zong, Śūnyatā school, Emptiness school, Madyamaka] teaches the Two Truths, the *Zhongguan-lun-song* [*Mulamaādhyamaka-karika*, *Verses on the Contemplation of the Middle Way*] says “The various Buddhas use the Two Truths as the basis for preaching the doctrine to all sentient beings,” and “all the causally produced dharmas I say are simply Emptiness which are also Provisional/False Names, which is also the meaning of the Middle Way.” This hymn is also speaking of the Two Truths of the True Truth [Ch. *zhen di*, Skt. *paramartha-satya*, absolute truth] and the Worldly Truth [Ch. *su di*, Skt. *samvrti-satya*, conventional truth].<sup>1</sup> From “dependent-origination” we can directly talk about the Two Truths of the True and the Worldly. In establishing its doctrine, the Weishi school [Vijnaptimatra/Yogacara, Mere-Ideation, Consciousness-Only, school] explains the special nature of dependent-origination dharmas. It propounds the theory of Three Substances, namely Substance of Other-Dependent-Origination [*yita qi xing*, Skt. *paratantra-svabhāva*, other-dependent nature], Substance of Overall

Calculation Attachment [*pianji zhi xing* , Skt. *parikalpita-svabhāva*, imagined nature], and Substance of Perfect Fulfilled Reality [*yuan cheng shi xing*, Skt. *parinispanna-svabhāva*, consummate nature].<sup>2</sup> The Three Substances [i.e., Three Natures] are actually another way of explaining the Two Truths. We shall come to that below.

The *Middle Treatise* [*Zhong Lun*, Skt. *Mulamaādhyamaka-karika*] explains the Two Truths--the True Truth [*paramārtha-satya*] and the Worldly/Conventional Truth [*samvrti-satya*], directly in terms of dependent-origination substance-empty [*yuanqi xingkong*], without any attachments. All originating [arising], cessation, permanence, extinction, identity, disparity, coming, and going are determinations [*dingxiang*定相, determined forms]. According to Buddhism, all determinations are attachments [also, infatuations], which is why in its opening words the *Middle Treatise* speaks of it from the reverse side: “Not originating and not ceasing, not permanent and not perishing, not identical and not different, not coming (into existence), not going (out of existence).” This is simply “The Eight Negations of Dependent-Origination”, which is also the same as “endurance of [patient meditation on] non-originating dharmas” [*wusheng fa ren*]. Only endurance of non-originating dharmas through experiencing the emptiness of substance [*ti fa kong*] can be counted as the Way of the bodhisattva. For that reason, the state of dependent-origination viewed in the *Middle Treatise* is the state of dependent-origination after attachment has been removed; it is not what the West calls causality. This does not mean that the *Middle Treatise* is unaware of attachment in the ordinary passions. Attachment is of course to be found in the ordinary passions, and it is only because they are there that we speak of removing them. When the *Middle Treatise* explains the Two Truths in terms of dependent-origination substance-empty, it has

presupposed attachment and has already dissolved it away. That is why from the perspective of the Weishi school the Two Truths of the *Middle Treatise* are simply the Two Substances, namely the Substance of Other-Dependent-Origination and the Substance of Perfect Fulfilled Reality, while it has failed to directly confront the third substance, Substance of Overall Calculation Attachment. Other-dependent-origination is simply dependent-origination, while the Perfect Fulfilled Reality is simply “true reality”, namely the concept of “emptiness of substance”. Although the *Middle Treatise* does not directly express “Substance of Overall Calculation Attachment” [*pianji zhi xing*], what it has dissolved is this very attachment, and it is just because it exists that it must be removed. Thus the Two Truths that it speaks of after attachment has been removed is in fact One Truth, namely the True Truth, also called the First Truth, which in sum is the concept of “dependent-origination substance-empty”. From the perspective of dependent-origination, it is Conventional/Worldly Truth, whereas from the perspective of emptiness of substance, it is True Truth. Therefore the statement “dependent-origination substance-empty” is an analytic proposition. Although we speak of the two truths, True Truth and Worldly Truth, what it really expresses is “The True and the Worldly are undivided [non-dual, unitary].” In fact the True Truth and the Worldly Truth are the same thing, that is, “dependent-origination substance-empty”. Thus we can say that the True and the Worldly are not two things. Seng Zhao [385-415] likewise wrote *Treatise on the Emptiness of the Unreal* [*Buzhen-kong-lun*] to explain this point.

In addition to the question of Two Substances corresponding to the Two Truths, the Weishi school also directly articulated the Substance of Overall Calculation Attachment, and therefore it spoke of Three Substances. The *Middle Treatise* does not

speak of attachment, but the Eight Negations of dependent-origination it propounds have already demolished attachment, which indicates that before the demolishing of attachment there was attachment, and this means that the existence of attachment must be assumed. Thus, the difference between the Two Truths and the Three Substances cannot determine the difference between the Kong school [the Madyamaka school] and the Weishi school, for that which is conveyed by the Two Truths and the Three Substances is the same meaning.

Although the Kong school emphasizes that “the True [*zhen*] and the Worldly/Conventional [*su*] are not two,” to the ordinary person the True and the Worldly are two. Consequently, Jiaxiang Jizang [549-623] of the San Lun school [Three Śāstras school, i.e., Mādhyamaka school] addresses the ordinary man by saying: “To-the-True Truth [*yu zhen di*], To-the-Worldly Truth [*yu su di*].”<sup>3</sup> “To [*yu*]” is the “to” of “towards.” What to the ordinary man is true is called “To-the-Worldly Truth.” What to the bodhisattva and Buddha is true is called “To-the-True Truth.” What to the bodhisattva is true may on the contrary be to the ordinary worldly man false; and what the worldly man regards as true is to the bodhisattva’s eyes seen as attachment. For example, scientific knowledge is “To-the-Worldly Truth.” People in the mundane world positively recognize it as true. As to the “To-the-True Truth” recognized by the Buddha and the bodhisattva, it is from the vantage point of science falsehood. In this way, the True and the Worldly are obviously two, which is to say, the “To-the-True Truth” and the “To-the-Worldly Truth” are two, not one.

In terms of the Kong school itself, when it demolished attachment and spoke of dependent-origination substance-empty, it was speaking of “the True and the Worldly

are not two.” The Buddha and the bodhisattva are without attachment, viewing the state of dependent-origination in terms of emptiness, and explaining emptiness in terms of dependent-origination as having no self-substance [*wu zi xing*, no self-nature, Skt. *anātman*]. Consequently in the eyes of the Buddha and the bodhisattva, the Two Truths of the True and the Worldly are merely one truth, the True Truth, which is simply the First Truth of the Middle Way [*mādhyamaka*] of “All the causally-produced dharmas I say are empty, which are also Provisional/False Names, which is also the meaning of the Middle Way.” But if thus the True and the Worldly are not two and are merely one True Truth, then the Worldly Truth, especially the “To-the-Worldly Truth” regarded by the ordinary person as true, will have no independent meaning. Then according to the foregoing theory, scientific knowledge would be “To-the-Worldly Truth,” and if so, would that mean that scientific knowledge would also be without independent meaning? If not, how should we place the “To-the-Worldly Truth”?

That the Worldly Truth and the To-the-Worldly Truth have no independent meaning in the statement “The True and the Worldly are not two” is a traditional interpretation within Buddhism. It is found in the Kong school and also in the Weishi school.<sup>4</sup> The Weishi school still explains the Three Substances in terms of dependent-origination dharmas. It likewise views dependent-origination as dependent-origination, not adding or subtracting, as being empty. But when the Weishi school and the Kong school speak of dependent-origination dharmas, the background of the two systems are different. The Kong school speaks of dependent-origination dharmas generally, without any determination, but regarding “dependent-origination substance-empty” as a universal principle, without indicating its ultimate grounding place. The Weishi school on the

other hand speaks of dependent-origination dharmas by concentrating and subsuming dependent-origination dharmas under “consciousness [*shi*, Skt. *viññāna*].” Thus it provides an original [fundamental] interpretation of the origin of the existence of all dharmas [all phenomena, all things in the world]. The eighth *viññāna*, called *ālayavijñana* [storehouse consciousness], is the source and origin of all dharmas.<sup>5</sup> *Ālaya* together with the seventh *viññāna*, sixth *viññāna*, and the preceding five *viññānas*, constitute a complete system of consciousness, and the flow and transience of consciousness produce all dependent-origination dharmas. It is from this interpretation of the characteristics of dharmas in terms of dependent-origination dharmas that the theory of the Three Substances emerges.

The first of the Three Substances is the Substance of Other-Dependent-Origination. Other-dependent-origination means arising from being dependent on something, namely a dependent-origination. The next is Substance of Overall-Calculation Attachment. Xuanzang [596-664] translated this phrase as the “Substance of the Attachment of Overall-Calculation [*pian ji suo zhi xing*],” generally referred to as the Substance of Overall-Calculation Attachment. Substance of Overall-Calculation Attachment is speaking in regard to the capability of consciousness. To say Substance of Attachment of Overall-Calculation is to emphasize the object [*xiang*, form] that one is attached to. Since there is an object that is being attached to, there is of course a subject [*shi*, consciousness] that can form an attachment. Hence the two ways of speaking are actually similar. Adding attachment to dependent-origination dharmas that arise from other-dependence is what is called Substance of Overall-Calculation Attachment [*pianji zhi xing*]. *Pian* is overall, distributive, everywhere; *ji* is calculation. In overall

dependent-origination dharmas, all our thought and calculation are applied and to that is added attachment, producing Overall-Calculation Attachment. Overall-Calculation Attachment is manifested with respect to dependent-origination dharmas, which is why we first speak of Substance of Other-Dependent-Origination, for all dharmas arise from other-dependency, and it is in this arising from other-dependency that there is naturally the Substance of Attachment of Overall-Calculation. The Attachment of Overall-Calculation refers to the determinations formed by the attachments resulting from other-dependent-origination, such as the arising, cessation, permanence, extinction, and so forth, all of them determinations. The Weishi school calls them the Attachments of Overall-Calculation, namely the determinations formed by overall pondering and calculation being attached to dependent-origination dharmas. The third substance is Substance of Perfect Fulfilled Reality [*yuancheng shi xing*]. All the dependent-origination dharmas that originate in the *ālaya* consciousness possess Substance of Perfect Fulfilled Reality, namely real substance. Xuanzang translated it as “*yuancheng shi xing* [Substance of Perfect Fulfilled Reality],” and Zhen Di [Paramārtha, fl.ca. CE 546] translated it as “*zhenshi xing* [real substance, real nature].”<sup>6</sup> The two meanings are the same. The Real Substance is the “*ru* 如 [such, thus]” substance expressed by “dependent-origination and substance-empty.” To contemplate dependent-origination as dependent-origination, not adding or subtracting, is simply without self-substance, emptiness of substance. This is the “Such substance” of all dharmas, which is “*ru xiang* 如相“ [Such form, Such character]. Only at this point can all things become perfect, fulfilled, and real. This is the Substance of Perfect Fulfilled Reality of all dependent-origination dharmas, namely authentic reality. How can the Substance of Perfect

Fulfilled Reality of dependent-origination dharmas be manifested? When there are determinations formed by the attachments of Overall-Calculation Attachments, the Substance of Perfect Fulfilled Reality will of course not be revealed. Therefore, only when we remove Overall-Calculation Attachments with respect to the other-dependent-origination of dependent-origination dharmas can the Perfect Fulfilled Reality appear. The Three Substances may be summarized by this statement.

Regardless of whether we translate it as Substance of Perfect Fulfilled Reality [*yuancheng shi xing*] or Real Reality [*zhenshi xing*, Real Substance] the two phrases should be carefully noted. We must not regard them as a substantial term, equivalent to reality in Western philosophy. The reality expressed analytically by Western philosophers affirms something and relates to phenomena. Consequently reality is a substantial term, denoting a reality corresponding to phenomena. For example, Plato believed that only the Idea was real, while the sensible world was not real. According to Kant's theory, only noumena are transcendent reality (except that they are not the objects of knowledge), while phenomena are merely appearances. More recently, when philosophers such as Bradley and Whitehead speak of reality, each uses the word to denote something ontologically real. On the other hand, the Substance of Perfect Fulfilled Reality and the Reality [*zhenshi xing*] that Buddhism speaks of refer to something else. Reality is the Real Substance of dependent-origination dharmas, namely “*shi xiang*” [literally “real form”, real character, realness], *ru xiang* [literally “such form”, suchness, thusness, as such, as thus]”. As soon as we speak of reality we think of there being an ontological substance. But suchness, as such [Skt. *tathata*, *bhutatahata*] is not ontological substance. Buddhism does not talk about ontological substance.

“*Ru* [as such, as thus, Skt. *tathā*],” is a very special concept of Buddhism. Bradley’s “the immediate this” seems close, but still it is not *ru*. The immediate this has merely not been differentiated by a predicate, which is to say, it has not been judged. All the same, it is still a substantial term and denotes something. “*Ru*” is not a substantial term. *Ru* [as such] is simply realness [*shixiang*, real-form, real characteristic] or Emptiness [*kong*]. Such terms as “*ru*” and “*kong* [emptiness]” in Buddhism I call “descriptive terms”. They are terms that “describe the signification of dependent-origination dharmas” but are not substantial terms. “*Ru*” is not “reality,” and if translated into English is best conveyed by suchness or as such. If dependent-origination is contemplated as dependent-origination, not adding or subtracting, then it is *ru* [as such]. Thus the *Prajñā Sūtra* says: “Realness [*shi xiang*] is Oneness [*yi xiang*], which is called Noneness [*wu xiang*], is simply Suchness [*ru xiang*].” [實相一相，所謂無相，即是如相.] Only if we understand dependent-origination dharmas in this way can we get the perfect, fulfilled, and real dependent-origination dharmas, in other words, get the Substance of Perfect-Fulfilled Reality [realness] of dharmas.

The dependent-origination dharmas thus explained represent a very unique feature of Buddhist thought, one which is rarely understood in this way. People generally read too much into it, believing that dependent-origination dharmas must have their own determined forms or determined substances, or that behind them there must be a First Cause or a God, or that the Way of Heaven [*tian dao*] serves as its base. From the Buddhist point of view, these are all Views of Permanence or Augmented Views. Or people may believe that since dependent-origination dharmas are without their own determined substances and determined forms, and without a First Cause or a God, or the

Way of Heaven as a base, then all dharmas having no determined standard and no proper place become nothing, leading to nullism [nihilism]. This, however, is a View of Nihilism [*duan jian* , Nihilism View], a subtracted and Diminished View. When Buddhism explains dependent-origination dharmas, it contemplates dependent-origination as dependent-origination, without adding or subtracting, which is *ru*, or suchness. This is a very peculiar way of thinking, and we must first have a clear understanding of the significance of this level.

Next, we have to point out that it is very significant that the Weishi school brings out “Substance of Overall-Calculation Attachment” formally. The position of the Kong school is to presuppose attachment and then to dissolve it away, with the result that it speaks only of Two Truths and does not especially emphasize attachment. The Weishi school directly expresses attachment and clearly speaks of Three Substances. This we must also carefully examine and understand.

First let us look at the Substance of Other-Dependent-Origination [*yita qi xin*]. Other-dependent-origination is to speak of it directly, but the Weishi school then explains it from the reverse side by saying that “Substance of Other-Dependent-Origination ” is “Substance of Non-Substance of Origination [*sheng wu zixing xing* 生無自性性],”<sup>7</sup> which is to say that the arising [origination] and the manifestation of all dependent-origination dharmas are without substance. The *Middle Treatise* also demolishes “origination [*sheng*],” when it says: “All dharmas do not arise of themselves, nor do they arise from others. They are not shared, nor are they without cause. Thus we know they are non-arising [non-originating].” This also indicates that “arising” is contrary to reason, is incomprehensible. What then is the meaning of what we call “arising” from an

empirical point of view? What does the concept “arising” denote? Actually, “arising” cannot be denoted. Borrowing Russell’s terminology, “arising [*sheng*, originating],” is not a “denoting term.”<sup>8</sup> Ordinary concepts like cow and horse are denoting terms, denoting a corresponding object. Although in our thought we can construct a concept of “arising,” we cannot in the empirical world point out an object for “arising” as we can for cow or horse. Arising is a state. For this kind of concept which expresses a state we can also borrow from Russell’s terminology by calling it an “incomplete symbol.” Complete symbols are denoting terms which can be substituted with such symbols as A, B, C, D, and so on, but cannot be canceled. An incomplete symbol is one which can be dissolved. The background for forming this concept of “arising” is actually a descriptive one. We describe a certain state to form a concept, resulting in the concept of “arising.” If “arising” is a concept possessing substance, then it will be a complete symbol, a denoting term denoting something and which cannot be dissolved. But “arising” describes a state and is an incomplete symbol. Therefore it can be dissolved, and thus it has no substance. Hence the expression “Substance of Without-Substance- Origination [*sheng wu zixing xing*, Substance of Origination-Without-Substance]”. The Substance of Other-Dependent-Origination means being born and arising through cause and condition. Therefore we speak of it in terms of “arising.” Since all dharmas depend on something else in order to arise, then the concept of “arising” is demolished. Hence “Substance of Other-Dependent-Origination ” is simply “Substance of Without-Substance-Origination [*sheng wu zixing xing*, Substance of Without-Substance-Arising].”

Next we come to Substance of Overall-Calculation Attachment. Expressing it from the reverse side it is “Substance of Determination-Without-Substance [*xiang wu zixing*

*xing*].” “*Xiang* [form, Skt. *lakṣaṇa*; mark, characteristic]” is likewise not a substantial term. Therefore it cannot be understood by such substantial terms as mode or form. Actually “*xiang*” is simply what Kant called “determination.” Kant spoke of determination from the perspective of categories.

When categories are applied to sensibility, determining the objects given by sensibility, this is the “transcendental determination” of categories. Each transcendental determination then becomes a *xiang*, namely the *xiang* discussed in Buddhism. For example, when the category of substance is applied to the object given by sensibility, the phenomenon [*xiang*] thus determined by transcendental determination is permanence. In Buddhist terminology it is called “*chang xiang* [permanent characteristic, permanence].” When the category of causality is applied to make a transcendental determination, the resulting phenomenon is cause and effect (*yinguo xiang*). And if the category of community is applied to the object, the resulting determination is the phenomenon of co-existence (*gongzai xiang*). Co-existence is different from cause and effect. Co-existence is horizontal, for example when you and I co-exist, and when we and the world co-exist. It is only because there is co-existence that we can regard all phenomena as a whole and form the concept of “the world.” Cause-and-effect is vertical. The phenomena that result from the transcendental determinations made through Kant’s twelve categories are in Buddhism simply the phenomena formed by the attachments of Overall-Calculation Attachments. The *a priori* forms of sensible intuition, namely time and space, are also determinations made through attachment. This is the doctrine and not merely our interpolation. Since determinations come from Overall-Calculation Attachments, they are of course illusory. Consequently there is no truth in them. Therefore the “Substance

of Overall-Calculation Attachment” is simply the “Substance of the Without-Substance-Determination“ [*xiang wu zixing xing*].

Of course Kant does not call the a priori forms of sensibility, namely time and space, and the legislative concepts of understanding, namely categories, attachments. For he recognizes scientific knowledge and moreover wants to make the actual world and scientific knowledge explicable and intelligible. But according to Buddhist doctrine, scientific knowledge is attachment and is formed through attachment. In the learning of the past, there were two contrasting kinds of knowledge. Confucianism distinguished between the knowledge of virtue and the knowledge of seeing and hearing. The knowledge of seeing and hearing is simply empirical knowledge, and only the knowledge of virtue can be without attachment. Leibniz also distinguished two kinds of knowledge, confused perception and clear perception. The former is empirical knowledge and scientific knowledge which are related to such components as time, space, and matter, and whose function is to represent the world. The latter refers to such purely formal knowledge as mathematics, whose function is to reveal God. Confused means muddy or murky, for it contains a material element. In conformity with the developments of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Kant recognized only scientific knowledge. Of course he also proposed intellectual intuition, which stood in contrast to sensible intuition. But at the same time he said that intellectual intuition belonged only to God, and thus we human beings have only one kind of knowledge, scientific knowledge. Here Kant did not realize that scientific knowledge is actually attachment. When scientific knowledge and intellectual intuition are contrasted, then scientific knowledge is none other than attachment. But traditionally Western philosophers do not contrast scientific

knowledge with intellectual intuition and so such terms as attachment have not occurred to them. On the other hand in the Buddhist tradition of China this kind of knowledge falls precisely under attachment and is produced by Overall-Calculation Attachment. Thus of the Three Substances, the Substance of Other-Dependent-Origination cannot be removed because all dharmas arise from cause and condition. The Substance of Perfect Fulfilled Reality is "Substance of the Without-Substance-Ultimate" [*sheng yi wu zixing xing*]," namely, is Emptiness, Suchness, which of course is even less removable. If one has to be removed, it will have to be Substance of Overall-Calculation Attachment because traditionally Overall-Calculation Attachment is viewed as a substance that is completely illusory and without truth. And so the Three Substances are actually Two Truths, not Three Truths.

But we have already said that while scientific knowledge falls under Overall-Calculation Attachments, scientific knowledge has considerable truth. If so, then Overall-Calculation Attachments should also not be regarded as completely illusory, but should also have considerable truth. This is how we in the present age approach the traditional point of view. If the Three Treatises [San Lun] school's "To-the-Worldly Truth" has no independent significance, then it will be impossible to place scientific knowledge in its proper position. Obviously traditional Buddhism had no intention of explaining scientific knowledge, for its goal was to seek deliverance, not to explain knowledge. But we in the present age find it necessary to reconsider the question of whether Overall-Calculation Attachment has considerable truth. This is not to say that all Overall-Calculation Attachments have truth, but to say that some attachments have considerable truth, such as scientific knowledge. For example, Kant maintained that the

phenomena determined by the transcendental determination of categories are all conditions that bring about experience and scientific knowledge, that make experience and scientific knowledge possible. If they certainly fall within the sphere of Overall-Calculation Attachments, then should not Substance of Overall-Calculation Attachments also possess considerable truth?

Overall-Calculation Attachments belong to the sphere of consciousness. Other-dependent-origination, that is, the Impure Other-Dependent [*ran yita*], also belongs to the sphere of consciousness. In the Weishi school there are two kinds of Other-Dependent-Origination, namely the Impure Other-Dependent and the Pure Other-Dependent. The human person's innate sensibility and understanding belong to consciousness and not to wisdom. Consciousness itself is impure, namely the so-called Eight Kinds of Impure Consciousness. On the other hand, the Weishi school also says that consciousness must transform, and what emerges after consciousness transforms into wisdom is the Pure Other-Dependent and the consciousness that comes out of wisdom is also transformed into the Eight Kinds of Pure Consciousness. The Other-Dependent is still other-dependent and is still emptiness of substance, for Buddhism says: "Remove the illness but not the dharmas.." For what is removed is attachment, while not one of the things that are illusion-like, delusion-like, are removed. Thus, before consciousness is transformed into wisdom, consciousness is impure and polluted, consciousness is attachment. Sensibility and understanding and the scientific knowledge made by them all belong to these Eight Kinds of Impure Consciousness.

There are those who object to my view that scientific knowledge is attachment. But why is scientific knowledge not attachment? If knowledge is just knowledge, the

question of attachment is irrelevant. But if we know that everything that belongs to the sphere of consciousness is attachment, then this is also the case with scientific knowledge. For example, according to Kant, mathematical knowledge is also made possible by categories. The first two kinds of categories (quality and quantity) Kant calls “mathematical” for the reason that they establish mathematics. The last two kinds of categories, relation and modality, are “dynamical” and belong to the sphere of physics.<sup>9</sup> Do not suppose that scientific knowledge is objective and therefore not attachments. Actually when scientific knowledge converts quality into quantity, that is attachment. For example, it is only by converting quality into quantity that present-day medicine can use scientific methods to measure and test. Of course there is effectiveness in this kind of method, for man has a physical body, belonging to matter, and there is of course an aspect that can be quantitatively measured. For the time being the person is not seen as a human being but as a machine, and from the quantitative aspect he is examined and operated on. Is this not converting quality into quantity? This is a kind of abstraction, and abstraction is simply attachment. Since scientific knowledge is made possible by the determination of categories, requiring abstraction, it is of course attachment.

Perhaps you think that scientific knowledge has no emotional component, as for example in mathematical computation, or when a physician operating on a patient cannot be emotional. In this sense, you believe that scientific knowledge cannot fall under attachments. That would be to limit attachments to their psychological meaning, to the sense that attachments will produce vexation. In the original Buddhist explanation of attachment, it explained vexation against the background of its pan-psychological meaning. Thus the Other-Dependent-Origination and the Overall-Calculation

Attachment of the Eight Kinds of Impure Consciousness would give rise to vexatious attachments. This was explaining vexation through the subjective psyche. But the “Eight Negations of Dependent-Origination” taught by the *Middle Treatise* is intended to demolish and remove attachment. If attachment is not removed but one clings to such phenomena as arising, cessation, permanence, extinction, identity, difference, coming, and going, this is also attachment. But this kind of attachment is not limited to the psychological sense. Neither do Kant’s twelve categories belong to the sphere of psychology; rather, they belong to the logical sphere. Thus Kant called the section discussing the categories “Transcendental Logic.” I might also add that transcendental logic is different from the formal logic that we generally speak of. Generally speaking, formal logic does not involve an object, whereas Kant’s transcendental logic must involve an object and furthermore must explain how an object is possible. If an attachment is only restricted to the psychological meaning, then those determinations are of course not attachments. But Buddhism says precisely that these determinations also belong to attachments, and consequently it says that Substance of Overall-Calculation Attachment is simply “The Substance of Non-Substance of Determination [Substance of Non-Determination]”. The Weishi school also has a term, “Dharmas Non-Corresponding to Mind [*bu xiangying xing fa*],” also called “The Provisional Dharmas of Differentiation [*fenwei jia fa*].” Since they are established provisionally, then they are of course attachments.

What is the meaning of “Thought-Dharmas Non-Corresponding to Mind [*bu xiangying xing fa*]”?<sup>10</sup> “*Xing* [acts]” belong to “*si* [thought],” where “*si*” has the psychological meaning and not the logical meaning. “*Si*” is “mental domain [*xin suo*,

mental place].” Mental domain means belonging to the mind, corresponding to the mind and united with the mind, namely what Western philosophy speaks of as the “mental state.” Since there is a “mental state [*xin suo*]” there should also be a “matter state [*wu suo*].” But there is no such term in Buddhism. Even so, we may still follow Buddhist terminology and speak analogously of the “*se suo* [matter state].” The *suo* [state] of *xin suo* [mental state] and *se suo* [matter state] does not refer to a place, but is an abbreviation for “*suo you* [that which belongs to],” meaning all the states and characteristics belonging to. “Matter state” means all the states of matter that are fused and joined indivisibly with matter. For example, the “primary qualities” that Locke speaks of can be called “*se suo*” [matter state]. In Buddhism, only extension and quantity correspond and are joined indivisibly to matter, and only they can be called matter state. Mental state [*xin suo*] refers to psychological activities, psychological phenomena, such as the emotions of joy, anger, sorrow and pleasure, thought, imagination, and so forth. When these psychological activities correspond and are joined indivisibly to the mind, they are the mental states corresponding to the mind. Besides these there are things that fall within that which *si* [thought] produces but do not correspond, namely they cannot be joined indivisibly, to the mind, nor can they be joined indivisibly to matter. Twenty-four kinds are listed by Buddhism, which when examined closely include all of the forms of sensibility described by Kant, namely time and space, and Kant’s pure concepts of the understanding, namely categories, and so forth. The corresponding “mental state” can establish a unified relationship with the mind, and the corresponding “matter state” can establish a unified relationship with matter. But non-corresponding dharmas cannot establish a relationship of unity or disparity with mind or matter. If we say that they are

different from mind, yet they are produced by thought, and thought also is a mental state. If we say they are the same as mind, yet they cannot be joined as one with the mind. For example, number, time, space all belong to Dharmas Non-Corresponding to Mind. Numbers are abstract. Leibniz also said that numbers are not completely of the mind but are “semi-mental.” Russell held that numbers belong to the domain of logic, being neither physical nor psychological. Kant held that time and space are the pure forms required for representing all phenomena. From this we may gather that numbers together with time and space are all not “mental states” that correspond to the mind. Since they do not correspond to the mind, can they be the “matter state” corresponding to matter? Evidently not, for although numbers, time, space, etc. can be linked to matter, they are not characteristics of the matter-state. These “Dharmas Non-Corresponding to Mind” are actually precisely what Kant called the forms of sensibility, namely time, space, and the legislative concepts, namely categories. These formal and lawlike concepts are all a priori, which, according to Buddhism, belong to *si*, “thought”, but do not correspond to the mind, for which reason they are not “mental states,” and are therefore called “Dharmas Non-Corresponding to Mind.” If we explain scientific knowledge with these concepts, then is not scientific knowledge also attachment? In the past, few Chinese were trained in logic and abstract thought. That is why when they encountered such terminology as “Dharmas Non-Corresponding to Mind” they were baffled. In fact, such terms are very meaningful and have a rich heuristic quality.

We have just tried to explain that there are two kinds of “attachment,” one having the psychological sense of referring to attachment that produces such emotions as vexation and suffering. Another is attachment in the logical sense. Logical attachment is

equivalent to what Western philosophy speaks of as positing. Fichte [1762-1814] was fond of using this term. For example the determinations demolished by the Eight Negations of Dependent-Origination are not vexatious attachments in the psychological sense, but are logical positing. From this we know that attachment is not restricted to the psychological sense, and that there is attachment in the logical sense. Generally *zhizhuo* is translated as attachment, which mainly conveys the psychological sense. It conveys most of the meaning, as it was the principal meaning in Buddhism originally. But when the doctrine speaks of “Dharmas Non-Corresponding to Mind,” then it is in the logical sense, then it is formal, while attachment in the psychological sense is material.

Westerners do not speak of attachment because they recognize only one kind of knowledge. Only when two kinds of knowledge are contrasted can we use such colorful terms as “attachment [*zhizhuo*].” Although Kant recognized two kinds of knowledge produced respectively by sensible intuition and intellectual intuition, Kant at the same time maintained that human beings possess only sensible intuition, while intellectual intuition belongs to God. Thus he separated the two subjects. This is different from Chinese philosophy, where both subjects are in me. I have consciousness, but it can be converted into wisdom. Only thus can the two kinds of knowledge, consciousness and wisdom, be contra-opposed, with each side clarified. That is why, strictly speaking, although Kant everywhere brings up the transcendental distinction between phenomena/appearance and thing-in-itself, he cannot actually in his writings fully justify it, the reason being that he has split apart the subject in two. Of course he is also very consistent, and so he adopts the negative sense saying that the thing-in-itself cannot be known, because the thing-in-itself cannot be presented to us, for we are only able to

assume some measure of it by logical inference. On the other hand, if we follow the teachings of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism on thing-in-itself, it can present itself, “as clearly as pointing to my palm,” and we certainly need not think of it by logical inference. Only thus can the contraopposition of phenomena and thing-in-itself be established, where both sides are made clear. Only thus can the transcendental distinction be established and be meaningful. My book *Appearance and Thing-in-Itself* [*Xianxiang yu Wuzishen*] is simply a re-interpretation of this question.

The preceding section has provided a re-interpretation of the Two Truths and Three Substances, showing how they were, as explained in the past, actually only One Truth, whence it was taught that the True and the Worldly are not two. But under our present re-evaluation, the True and the Worldly are two, namely “To-the-Worldly the Truth” has considerable independence, while the attachment represented by scientific knowledge also has considerable truth.

Going a step further there is another question: Since there are definitely two kinds of truths, the True and the Worldly, and scientific knowledge falls under the Worldly Truth and also has considerable truth, then is there necessity for the Worldly Truth established by attachment? Besides, what is the relation between the two kinds of truth, the True Truth [*paramārtha-satya*] and the Worldly Truth [*samvrti-satya*]?

Traditional Buddhism holds that the Attachments of Overall-Calculation are all illusory and without truth, and hence must be eradicated. But according to our preceding discussion the Attachments of Overall-Calculation also have considerable truth, and since they have truth they should be retained. In that case, can they be preserved in Buddhism? For example, from the position of Buddhism, can scientific knowledge be retained?

Taking as an example present-day medicine, present-day Buddhists must also seek help from Western medicine when they are ill. In that case, they cannot say that Western medicine is completely illusory. To use a Buddhist term, it can be called “an expedient.” Since it is needed it should be preserved, and in this need and preservation it has necessity. Likewise with scientific knowledge. In Buddhist doctrine there is also a concept which can clarify and protect expedients of this kind. It is called “the Way of the bodhisattva [*pusa dao*].” Of course if one has reached the state of the bodhisattva, one can use one’s supernatural powers to dissolve away the illness and not need a Western doctor. But the bodhisattva, for the sake of conforming with ordinary men in order to live the practical life, can also seek a Western doctor and not resort to supernatural powers. For the bodhisattva cannot completely separate himself from the multitude and the Worldly, since if he did he would not be able to ferry over the many sentient beings to salvation. Thus the bodhisattva expediently retains scientific knowledge, retaining the necessity of scientific knowledge through his “great compassionate heart.” This kind of necessity is not logical but dialectical, a dialectical necessity. We have said that the Buddha’s and the bodhisattva’s Dharma-body [*dharmakaya*, Truth-body, the enlightened true self] can exhibit supernatural powers and is not in need of Western medicine, but this is speaking analytically and abstractly. It is not the ultimate spiritual state. When one has reached the state of perfect Buddhahood, the Buddha’s great compassionate heart will certainly need this scientific and empirical knowledge, and this will preserve its necessity.

When the Buddhist bodhisattva opens his compassionate heart and needs the attachments that have truth, then he must drop down from his Dharma-body and practice

self-negation so as to conform to the Worldly and the multitude. Only then can he ferry over and save the multitude of sentient beings. To give an example, being a holy man [*shengren*, sage] not the same as being a president. If the holy man wants to be a president, he must also leave his status of holy man and observe the political rules of being a president; this would be the “self-negation” of the holy man. Similarly, a bodhisattva also needs scientific knowledge in order to ferry across the multitude of sentient beings; thus he will practice self-negation in order to make possible scientific knowledge, and will furthermore preserve the necessity of scientific knowledge. This method of protecting is dialectical, not logical. Thus its necessity is a preserving necessity and the great compassionate heart is its transcendental ground.

In terms of the perfect real state of perfect Buddhahood, all dharmas are laid even. They can only be transformed, not canceled. Then all dharmas (including the determined attachments of scientific knowledge) will have eternal necessity. But in a certain sense in terms of only the Buddha Dharma-body, although it has ensured the necessity of scientific knowledge through its great compassionate heart, it can also cancel and dissolve it when it is not needed. Thus it is still an expedient. Although science regarded as power and expedient is not the state of Perfect Teaching [Perfect Doctrine], the three doctrines of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism in the Chinese tradition all imply this level of meaning. In terms of scientific knowledge as expedient, its necessity can be affirmed and can be canceled. This is what I call “Having [*you*, there is] can also not-have [*wu*, there is not]. Not-having [*wu*] can also have [*you*],” [Being can also become Nothing, Nothing can also become Being] coming and going freely. This has been the case with scientific knowledge in the Chinese scholarly tradition. But this cannot be so in

the Western Christian tradition. In the Christian tradition, scientific knowledge is “Having [you] cannot not-have [wu]. Not-have [wu] cannot have [you].” “Having” in “Having cannot not-have” refers to humankind. Although scientific knowledge is a late achievement of humankind, once the human being has it, he must have it and it cannot be canceled. “Not-having” in “Not-having cannot have” refers to God. God sees all and has no need of scientific knowledge; nor does He need categories. According to Kant, God possesses intellectual intuition and this intellectual intuition cannot achieve scientific knowledge. In Buddhism, *prajñā*-wisdom in its own meaning does not contain scientific knowledge nor categories. Thus scientific knowledge is developed through the dialectic process of *prajñā* wisdom and is needed by the bodhisattva Way. The emphasis of the Three Teachings of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism in the Chinese tradition is not on scientific knowledge. As a result it did not develop the modern science of the West. But now that we need scientific knowledge in the present day, we can still absorb and learn it. This then is “Not having can also have.” Once we have it, we can, from the perspective of the discipline of achieving sagehood and Buddhahood, still cancel and dissolve science. This is “Having can also not-have.” The Western tradition cannot cancel scientific knowledge, which is to say it cannot alternate and revolve between advancing and retreating, coming and going freely. That is why there is pan-scientism, pan-technologism, leading humankind on the road to annihilation, which is the trend of present-day civilization. Buddhism’s teaching of transforming consciousness into wisdom is directed at dissolving away the attachment in consciousness and transforming it into wisdom. Thus attachment and scientific knowledge can be canceled.

If the Buddha self-consciously wants the attachments of scientific knowledge, then he can also with self-negation drop down from the position of wisdom onto consciousness. Then at this juncture the non-enlightenment evinced by consciousness is “Enlightened non-enlightenment,” which is a paradox and can be described lightly as “hard-to-get muddlement” [“hard-to-get non-enlightenment”]. Then the muddled non-enlightenment of the ordinary person is “Non-enlightened non-enlightenment.” These two levels are still different.<sup>11</sup>

Beside the questions of dependent-origination substance-empty and Two Truths together with Three Substances, there are several other major questions in Buddhism. Next time we shall first discuss the question of “One mind opens two doors,” a doctrine of the *Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna* [*Dasheng-qixin-lun*, Skt. *Mahayana-sraddotpāda-sāstra*]. This is the *tathāgata-garbha* [*rulai zang*, Buddha-Womb] system that has advanced a step further than the *ālaya* system. The formulation of principles in “One mind opens two doors” is rich in significance, and they can address many of the philosophical questions in Western philosophy, the most directly related being Kant’s distinction between noumena and phenomena. This system can assimilate Kant and enable him to go a step further. Lastly there remains the question of Perfect Teaching [*yuan jiao*, Perfect Doctrine]. Because the concept of Perfect Teaching is not found in Western philosophy, it is a very unique and significant issue. The question of Perfect Teaching contains the central question of “analytical discourse” [*fenbie shuo*, differentiating discourse] and “non-analytical discourse [non-differentiating teaching]” and the question of “Matter and mind are not two.” The question of “Matter and mind are not two” can address many philosophical positions of the West. Then there is the

question of the Perfect Good [*yuán shān*], which is the question of *summum bonum*, highest good, in Western philosophy. Only when we reach the state of Perfect Teaching can we solve the question of the highest good. We shall discuss these questions successively later on.

Transcribed by Yi-hsien Hu 胡以嫻

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<sup>1</sup>See *Zhong-guan-lun (Mula-Mādhyamaka-karika)*, "Si Di Pin"[Chapter on the Four Truths]. Based on these verses, the Tiantai school also spoke of Three Contemplations, which are also Three Truths. For example Zhizhe Dashi [Zhiyi, 538-597 A.D.]'s *Mohe Zhiguan (Mahāsamādhā-viśāyānā, Great Calming and Insight Meditation)*, *juan 5A* says: "...As to one dharma being all dharmas and arising from causes and conditions and being Provisional Names [*jiā míng* · False Names], that is Contemplation of the Provisional [*jiā guān*]. As to all dharmas being one dharma, I say they are empty, and that is Contemplation of Emptiness. The not-one and not-all is Contemplation of the Middle Way."

<sup>2</sup>This is based on Xuanzang's translation. For example *Weishi Sanshi Lun Song [Vidyā-mātrasiddhi-triśaśakārikā-sāstra]*; Thitty Verses on Mere Consciousness]; *Cheng Weishi Lun [Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi-sāstra]*; Treatise on the Establishment of the State of Mere Representation ], *juan 8*; *Jie Shenmi Jin [Sandhi-nirmocana-sūtra; Elucidation-of-the-Deep-Mystery Sutra]*, etc.

<sup>3</sup>See Jizang's *Er Di Yi [Meaning of the Two Truths]*.

<sup>4</sup>The Kong school [Kong Zong 空宗] speaks of Two Truths, for example, in the *Zhong-guan-lun*, "Si Di Pin [Chapter on the Four Truths]", says: "If we do not understand and thus differentiate between the Two Truths, then we will not understand the real meaning of the doctrines of Buddha. If we do not rely on the Worldly Truth we will miss the First Truth [True Truth]. If we miss the First Truth, then will miss nirvana." The Weishi school says in *Cheng-weishi-lun, juan 9*: "...I mean that the nature of consciousness-only is of two kinds: One is illusion, namely attachment held by overall calculation. The other is the real, namely Substance of Perfect Fulfilled Reality [*yuancheng shi xing*]. In order to clarify illusion I have explained real substance [*shi xing*, real nature]. Then again, there are Two Substances [*er xing*, Two Natures]: One is the Worldly Truth, called Substance of Other-Dependent-Origination. The second is True Truth, called Perfect Fulfilled Reality. In order to clarify Worldly Truth, we therefore talk of real substance." All this is to say that "the True and the Worldly are not two."

<sup>5</sup>See *Weishi-sanshi-lun-song*, and also *Cheng-weishi-lun, juan 3* and *juan 7*, etc. Also see Mou Zongsan, *Foxing yu Bore* [Buddha-Nature and Prajna] (Taipei: Xuesheng Shuju, 1977), vol. 1, part 2, chaps. 2-4.

<sup>6</sup>The terms for *San Xing* [Three Substances, Three Natures] have been translated differently by Paramārtha. The *San-wuxing-lun [Treatise on Three Without-Substances]*, *juan shang* says: "All dharmas fall within the Three Substances [*san xing*]: First, Substance of Differentiation [*fenbie xing*]; second, Substance of Other-Dependency [*yita xing*]; third, Substance of True Reality [*zhenshi xing*]. ...Then following these three substances we speak of the three Without-Substances. ...the Substance of Differentiation has as its substance No Form...the Substance of Dependent-Origination has as its substance Non Arising,...the Substance of Reality has as its substance Without-Substance."

<sup>7</sup>*Cheng Weishi Lun, juan 9* says: "This is to say that following the initial Substance of Overall Calculation Attachment we establish the Non-Substance of Form... following the next Substance of Other-Dependent-Origination we establish the Without-Substance of Arising... Following the last Substance of Perfect-Fulfilled-Reality we establish the Without-Substance of the Ultimate." Also, for example, *Jie Shenmi Jing*, "Chapter on Forms Without Substance" says: "You should know that following the three kinds of substances of without-substance [without self-substance], my hidden meaning is that all dharmas have no substance, which is to say that form has no substance, arising has no substance, the True Truth [*shengyi*] has no substance... What then is the meaning of all forms of dharmas are without substance? It is to say that all dharmas are forms of overall calculation attachment. And what is the meaning of the arisings of all dharmas are without substance? It is to say that all dharmas are forms of Other-Dependent-Origination. Moreover, there are forms of perfect-fulfilled-reality of dharmas, which are also called the without-substance of the True Truth."

<sup>8</sup>For this phrase and passage see Russell's *Principia Mathematica*, vol. 1, chaps 4 and 5.

<sup>9</sup>See Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, English translation by Kemp Smith, page 116, 196ff.

<sup>10</sup>For this passage see Mou, *Fo Xing yu Bore*, vol. 1, ch. 3.

<sup>11</sup>For the above passages see Mou Zongsan, *Xianxiang yu Wuzhishen (Appearance and Thing-in-Itself)*.